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ABSTRACT 
Numbers of writers have agreed that technology is political, yet in exactly what 
ways this is to be understood has been the subject of much debate. One author whose work 
has been influential in this regard is Langdon Winner. In his two books. Autonomous 
Technology and The Whale and the Reactor, he has argued that profitable insights can be 
gained by the application of the categories of political philosophy to the study of 
"technology itself", which, for him, involves understanding technologies as "political 
phenomena in their own right". 
In this thesis, I examine this claim and argue that, while Winner's analysis provides 
perceptive insights into the challenges posed by technology for contemporary politics, his 
locating of the political in the technology itself has significant conceptual problems. I will 
suggest that most of the problems in Winner's analysis arise from his inconsistent 
understanding and use of the concepts, "technology" and "politics". Furthermore, I argue 
that his failure to draw out the ideological nature of much of the discourse surrounding 
technological decision-making is a key weakness in his analysis and I suggest how such a 
perspective would do much to reconcile many of the ambiguities in his argument. 
INTRODUCTION 
That technology has significant implications for political life has been long 
recognised. However, what those implications are and how they should be addressed has 
been a matter of considerable ongoing debate. While the continuous development of 
science and technology has, for the past two hundred years, been seen as the 
indispensable motive power of progress, the post-war period, particularly since the 
sixties, has wimessed a growing restlessness about the identification of social progress 
with technological development. Environmental despoliation, worker alienation, urban 
breakdown, the greenhouse effect, exploitation of the Third World, and the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons are just some examples of what are widely understood to be 
manifestations of the failure of the technological promise. 
Critical studies from a number of different perspectives have called for and sought 
to provide a re-evaluation of the role of technology in modem societies. However, very 
few have sought to address specifically the issue of politics and technology. This may be 
due to the fact that in social thought, as Badham has shown, ̂  there have been two 
dominant theoretical approaches to the politics of technology - industrial society theory 
and capitalist society theory. The dominance of these two models has tended to result in 
the conceptual separation of technology and politics, with the result that analysis focusses 
either on the development of technology, understanding the political as essentially 
responses to that development (industrial society theory), or alternatively on the politics 
of the existing class structure, understanding technology essentially as a reflection of that 
class structure (capitalist society theory). 
However, both theories can be said to share a common characteristic: the denial of 
the primacy of the political. In industrial society theory this is most obvious; here 
technology is understood as obeying its own technical requirements in relative autonomy, 
a situation to which politics must then necessarily adapt. In capitalist society theory, on 
the other hand, the devaluation of the political is a result of the Marxist understanding of 
politics as essentially a transitional stage - an aspect of the superstructure of capitalist 
1 Badham R., Theories of Industrial Societv (Croom Hehn, London 1986). 
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scx îety, which will ultimately disappear in a communist future. Thus while the capitalist 
society analysis appears to have a greater commitment to the primacy of politics, it is only 
to be understood as a reflection of more profound structural contradictions within 
capitalism and an expression of class struggle. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, there has been within each of these perspectives a 
recurring argument that technology itself is political. But what exactly is meant by this 
claim? Does it represent a theoretical synthesis which does full justice to both the 
technological and the political, or does it merely conflate the one into the other? What 
does such a claim understand "technology" and "politics" to mean? 
This thesis aims to explore these questions as they are addressed in the work of 
Langdon Winner. Winner has consistently sought to explore the phenomenon of 
technology for contemporary political life. In so doing, he has formulated a "theory of 
technological politics", a perspective which he claims takes seriously the technical 
artifacts themselves and which, in fact, "identifies certain technologies as political 
2 
phenomena in their own right". Winner is significant in that his work can be understood 
as providing a theoretical bridge between those who are interested in a macro-analysis of 
technological change, and those who prefer the perspective of micro-analysis. At the 
same time, his contribution is distinctive for its commitment to the necessity for and 
centrality of political philosophy as a tool for technological analysis. 
Winner's work is characterized by the clarity of its insights into the challenges 
which technology poses for modem society and its strong commitment to democratic 
political theory. However, this thesis will argue that these strengths in fact become 
weaknesses when Winner seeks to analyse the political nature of technology. It will be 
suggested that his predilection to understand technology as culture and politics as 
democratic politics significantly restricts his perspective and limits the value of his 
analysis. 
In order to gain a clearer understanding of Winner's argument, Chapter One will 
attempt to place him in some sort of context by briefly referring to four authors who have 
2 Winner,L., The Whale and the Reactor (University of Chicago, Chicago 1986) p.22. 
made crucial contributions to the intellectual framework within which he develops his 
theory, a framework that is generally critical of the implications of technology for political 
life: Jacques Ellul, Herbert Marcuse, David Dickson and Harry Braverman. Chapters 
Two and Three will then focus on Winner's argument in Autonomous Technology and 
The Whale and the Reactor respectively, before a final assessment of his work is 
attempted in the concluding chapter. 
CHAPTER ONE 
While there is no pretension here to exhaustiveness in choice or treatment, 
EUul, Marcuse, Dickson and Braverman have provided what have become classical 
statements of the political nature-of technology and at the same time are very much 
representative of the changing nature of critical technology analysis over the past three 
decades. They also represent the movement in Winner's own work, from the more 
macro analysis of the politics of technology, Autonomous Technology in which he 
draws considerably on Ellul and Marcuse, to the more focussed discussion on the 
politics of artifacts in The Whale and the Reactor where he explores perspectives 
previously developed by Dickson and Braverman. It will be instructive to examine the 
ways in which Winner draws on and yet differs from them. 
Jacques Ellul 
Of central significance for an understanding of the intellectual influences on 
Langdon Winner is the work of Jacques Ellul. With the 1964 American publication of 
The Technological Societv. ̂  Ellul established himself in the English speaking world as 
a perceptive critic of the increasingly technical rationality of modem Westem societies. 
For him, technique is totalitarian in its effectiveness. His use of "la technique" does not 
refer to machines, technology or any particular means of achieving ends but, sees it, in 
a somewhat tautological definition, as the "totality of methods rationally arrived at and 
having absolute efficiency (for a given stage*of development) in every field of human 
activity".2 His analysis covers such "private" activities as sport, leisure and sex, as 
well as the more "public" concerns of work, economics and of course, politics. Ellul 
understands the political as "relating to the state and not to just any power, or just any 
1 Ellul, J., The Technological Society (Vintage, New York 1964), (originally published in French in 1954). 2 Ibid., p.xxv. 
scxjial activity".^ For Ellul, as a result of the domination of technique, it is no longer 
possible to speak of the state in traditional classical terms, but only in technical terms; 
"The technological state corresponds direcdy to modem society itself since it is 
technically constructed and exists in the very soul of men who worship efficiency, 
order and speed. The classical state corresponds to vanished forces of an entirely 
different nature".4 This has obvious implications for democratic politics: "(T)he 
doctrines of traditional democracy - the rights of man, the abstract conception of the 
citizen, equality in voting, the clash between power and liberty - are not adapted to 
modem social reality. For this reason, we are witnessing the rapid sclerosis and 
obsolescence of these doctrines; and it is becoming harder and harder to defend them. "5 
The power of technique is such that politics as traditionally understood no longer 
exists, disappearing through its failure to adapt. And it is not a question of whether 
such developments take place within a capitalist or socialist framework; all alike are 
dominated by technique. Yet, ironically, through the expansion of the State into 
unprecedented areas of social life, all questions have become political questions, and, in 
tum, all political questions have been reduced to technical questions: "It is not that 
political problems are disappearing, but, rather, that the free play of traditional political 
forms is an illusion".^ 
To those who argue that technological progress has advanced the movement 
towards democratization and social equality through the elimination of scarcity and the 
greater availability of goods, Ellul responds that such a process is democratic in name 
only; the "improvements" have been brought about not by the free intervention of the 
people themselves, but by the demands and operation of technique. "Technique is the 
boundary of democracy. What technique wins, democracy loses." ^ It is not so much 
that the State becomes a technocracy, although that is tme, but more significantly that 
politicians themselves become "mere" technicians. For them, "the nation is essentially 
3 Ellul, J., The Political Illusion (Vintage, New York 1972), p.l5. 4 The Technological Societv. p.280. 
5 Ibid. 6 The Political Illusion, p.65. 
7 The Technological Societv. p.209. 
an affair to be managed... the state is not the expression of popular will, or a creation 
of God or the essence of humanity, or a modality of the class war. It is an enterprise 
with certain services which ought to function properly. It is an enterprise which ought 
to be profitable, yield a maximum of efficiency, and have the nation for its working 
capital".8 Technical decisions become unchallengeable by parliaments on any moral or 
ideological grounds; order replaces justice, with the latter invoked purely for the sake of 
justification. For the modem State to function efficiently, then submission to technique 
is inevitable. Interestingly, EUul suggests that only political corruption has the potential 
to thwart the progress of technique in politics. However, as it represents the elevation 
of essentially private interests,, for Ellul, it must be considered non-political.9 
Ellul's understanding of politics is however somewhat ambiguous. There seems to 
be on the one hand the "political illusion", where the state comes to have increasing 
power over every aspect of human existence through the totalitarian nature of 
technique, especially evident in technology and propaganda, and on the other, what he 
considers to be a more "genuine" political response based on small and committed issue 
groupings, in short a genuinely democratic politics. He claims that in calling for a broad 
depoliticization in the face of the totalitarian tendencies of technique, he is not calling 
people to abandon politics itself. He is calling for the abandonment of the hope that 
anything of value can be achieved through "constitutional rules, good institutions, or 
socio-economic changes". There is no chance that the citizen can control the state. 
Nevertheless, "Politics is a problem of life, and of life without respite ... Experience 
has shown that the state will retreat only when it meets an insurmountable obstacle. 
This obstacle can only be man, i.e. citizens organized independently of the state". 
8 Ibid., pp.263-4. 
9 Ibid., p.262. Note particularly his discussion on the nature of general interests as 
opposed to particular interests in relation to technique. 
10 Ibid.. p.202. Ellul cites as an essential precondition for such developments the 
démystification of the political illusion and the dominant political myths. However, he 
doesn't elaborate upon how such is to be accomplished. His understanding of 
propaganda carries suggestions of "false consciousness" and yet some discussion of 
the role of the broader ideological framework may have strengthened his claims that 
genuine politics may be possible as a result of changed consciousness. Cf.below. 
Thus the politics which Ellul sees as rendered obsolete, the "political illusion", 
is that which places absolute dependence for solutions to political questions upon the 
state. It is large-scale, impersonal, technocratic and absolute. The alternative, which 
Ellul appears reluctant to call "political", is small-scale, personal, human and limited. 
His description of his own "political" involvement is instructive here. 11 He explains 
that it was never his goal to get rid of technology but to develop new directions by 
reaching the "average" person, those who are more in touch with the "true" values of 
life than "intellectuals, technical experts, and executives". However, for Ellul the 
average person must be shown and taught what is "really" happening and this appears 
to be his task. "All this led me to concentrate on local initiatives - that is, to rely on 
direct and close relationships to form groups for investigating the issues that require 
people to take a stand on technology and the technological system, but which are also 
very concrete". 
This raises a number of significant points. First, Ellul has a view of individuals 
that appears romantic and indeed somewhat rarefied in the light of his critique of the 
totalitarian nature of technological society. Any political change appears to be located 
within a change in consciousness; how such a change in consciousness proceeds to 
change political and social realities is unclear. The role of the intellectual is obviously 
important here, and yet also somewhat ambiguous. There is no doubt that Ellul 
understands the ambivalent nature of the political role of the intellectual, but his account 
begs some questions. Is it only as the "average person" is "enlightened" (by Ellul, the 
intellectual?) that he or she can arrive at a better understanding of the situation "than 
intellectuals, technical experts or executives" who are dominated by technique? What is 
the source of his immunity from the dominant technological rationality? And what of 
politics as freedom if such is conditional on enlightenment? There are some 
11 In a series of interviews edited by William H. Vanderburg, Perspectives on our Age 
(Seabury Press, New York 1981). 
12 Ibid., p.80-1. Ellul also comments on the dangers of political' involvement; "Again 
and again, people tried to draw me into political circles, saying that something was 
happening politically that might lead to the acceptance of my analyses! This is a trap for 
the ecological movements. I feel that any action pertaining to the technological milieu is 
extraordinarily enveloping, and I might say, extraordinarily seductive".(p.82.) 
problematical authoritarian and elitist implications in this approach. Of most interest 
here is his suggestion of the existence of false consciousness, the unmasking of which 
provides the greatest hope for genuine liberation. However, he doesn't explore the 
dynamics of this ideological deconstruction.l^ As a result, the processes by which the 
social reproduction of the power of technique is effected remain unexamined, as does 
the associated question as to the means by which politics come to be so distorted. 
While many commentators have referred to Ellul's unrelieved pessimism, it is 
incorrect to conclude from his analysis that one is reduced to passive resignation. Ellul 
argues that his work is intended as a warning. For him realism about the possibility of 
action in a technological society is the only basis for action. "If an increasing number of 
people become fully aware of the threat the technological world poses to man's 
personal and spiritual life, and if they determine to assert their freedom by upsetting the 
course of this evolution, my forecast will be invalidated" ^^ 
For Ellul, then, action and choice are possible, but only within authentic individual 
lives, suitably alert to the reality of their condition. Political institutions and processes 
associated with the state have been irreversibly transformed by technique. It is 
impossible to deal with technology by political action involving state institutions, since 
politics itself has become an expression of that very technology. Only through the 
transformation of consciousness and grassroots action can the real challenge to the 
power of the technological society be undertaken. Yet Ellul understands this grassroots 
approach as lying outside "politics", because it rejects the institutions of a state, 
dominated by technique, and appeals instead to the individual consciousness. "While 
crowds of people adopt all the technological developments, we can act only on 
individual levels...this implies a development of the intellect and a development of 
consciousness which can come about only for individuals, but it is the only 
development possible".^^ Individual consciousness expressed through small 
13 Cf. note 10. 14 The Technological Societv. p.xxx. 
15 Ibid., p.82. 
committed groups is the only hope for social and political change in modem society. ^^ 
Only so, can a genuine democratic politics be realised. 
Ellul's analysis places him very much within the perspective of industrial 
society theory where the development of technology is seen as essentially autonomous 
and politics as reactive. Indeed, Ellul goes further and claims that the very conjuncture 
of state and technique has transformed politics and rendered political institutions 
irrelevant. However, his use of the wide-ranging yet vague concept of technique and 
his ambiguity as to what constitutes genuine politics leaves his analysis weak in terms 
of its explanatory power. There is no attempt to analyse the dynamics of technological 
development, to undertake any study of the political circumstances of such 
developments nor to pursue the question of false consciousness and the nature of 
ideological constructions as they apply to a political understanding of technology. What 
he provides is a primarily descriptive study of technique as a social phenomenon. 
However, he fails to locate the source of that phenomenon, and in particular fails to 
show how his thesis differs from that of Max Weber who identified a similar process of 
systematic rationalization, a process however which he attributed to capitalism. ̂ ^ 
Herbert Marcuse 
Adopting a somewhat similar perspective, yet from a different starting point, is 
Herbert Marcuse. Interestingly, his most popular work, One-Dimensional Man, was 
also published in 1964. In this work, Marcuse ranges over a wide area in providing 
16 In his preface to the revised American edition of The Technological Society. Ellul argues that his analysis is at the level of the sociological only and as such cannot deal with the level of individual action which is indeed possible; "As I see it, individual decisions are always made within the framework of this sociological reality, itself pré-existent and more or less determinative. I have simply endeavoured to describe technique as a sociological reality. We are dealing with collective mechanisms, with relationships among collective movements, and with modifications of political or economic structures", (p.xxviii) Thus it appears to be politics as a collective experience that is transformed by technique and which constitutes the "political illusion". 
17 Cf. discussion on the Weberian concept of rationalization in Brubaker, R., The Limits to Rationalitv (George Allen & Unwin, London 1984). 
what is essentially a philosophical treatise on the irrationality of the Rational, 
understanding science and technology as expressive of and embodying most clearly this 
new form of domination. Although he writes from a neo-Marxist perspective, Marcuse 
attempts to provide a revision of Marxist theory which had held that the growth in the 
forces of production would be liberating, in providing for the satisfaction of material 
needs and at the same time increasing the contradictions which would lead inevitably to 
a non-alienated communist society. In fact, Marcuse appears as equally despairing as 
Ellul of the possibility of any genuine politics within the totalitarian technical rationality 
of modem industrial society. Rather than possessing emancipatory potential, modem 
technology actually serves to increase domination. "In the face of the totalitarian 
features of this society, the traditional notion of the "neutrality' of technology can no 
longer be maintained. Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is 
put; the technological society is a system of domination which operates already in the 
concept and constmction of t e c h n i q u e s . " ^ ^ 
As with Ellul, Marcuse argues that while a genuine politics was once possible in 
choosing between historical altematives, "once the project has become operative in the 
basic institutions and relations, it tends to become exclusive and to determine the 
development of the society as a whole. As a technological universe, advanced industrial 
society is a political universe, the latest stage in the realization of a specific historical 
project - namely the experience, transformation, and organization of nature as the mere 
stuff of d o m i n a t i o n " . Marcuse's summary is as blunt as that of Ellul: "In the medium 
of technology, culture, politics, and the economy merge into an omnipresent system 
which swallows up or repulses all altematives ... Technological rationality has become 
political rationality".^^ 
This is a reversal of Ellul's argument that "politics have become technics", and 
yet it amounts to the same thing. The difference in expression appears to come from 
Marcuse's determination to try to hold to the primacy of an analysis in which he can 
18 Marcuse, H., One-Dimensional Man (Abacus, London 1972), p. 14. 
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still speak oi political domination within capitalism (which as we will see he finds 
difficult to maintain). 
Marcuse argues that genuine politics is essentially the operation of negation and 
criticism reflected essentially in the class struggle: politics is the process of social 
change by which "true" human freedom can be realised. For him, genuine politics has 
been replaced by one-dimensional politics, where criticism and autonomy have been 
annulled by materialism and the satisfaction of "needs". Moreover, there is no longer 
any rationale for transcending the society. Traditional politics fed on tension and 
contradiction; the efficiency of the one-dimensional society has however managed to 
contain social change. "Independence of thought, autonomy and the right to political 
opposition are being deprived of their basic critical function in a society which seems 
increasingly capable of satisfying the needs of the individuals through the way in which 
it is organized. Such a society may justly demand acceptance of its principles and 
institutions, and reduce the opposition to the discussion and promotion of alternative 
policies within the status quo".^^ Autonomy has been sacrificed for the achievement of 
material gain, resulting in " a comfortable, smooth, democratic unfreedom...in 
advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress".22 
For Marcuse, then, the political implications of technology lie not so much in 
the technology itself as in its unprecedented productive power: "If the individuals are 
satisfied to the point of happiness with the goods and services handed down to them by 
the administration, why should they insist on different institutions for a different 
production of different goods and services?" 
Despite his Marxist perspective, Marcuse argues that as a result of the capacity 
of industrial production, domination is no longer effected through the class structure of 
capitalist society per se but by the very nature of science and technology within 
advanced industrial societies. It no longer appears that a class analysis is possible, for 
the traditional antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat is no longer the motor of 
21 ibid., p. 16. 
22 m 23 Ibid, pp.52-3. 
social change. Both classes are subjected to technological domination and committed to 
the preservation of the status quo. 
Marcuse in fact proceeds to argue that if there is to be revolutionary action, it 
will come not through the working class which has been totally absorbed into and 
transformed by the technological society, but through the marginalised, who are the 
only group "outside" the system and therefore to some degree autonomous. Marcuse 
argues that the welfare state has become "the rational and material ground for the 
unification of opposites, for one-dimensional political behaviour. On this ground, the 
transcending political forces within society are arrested and qualitative change appears 
possibly only as a change from without"?'^ This opposition however will not be so 
much conscious and deliberate as an extension of their attempts to survive: "They exist 
outside the democratic process; their life is the immediate and most real need for ending 
intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if 
their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is 
therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules 
of the game, and in doing so, reveals it as a rigged g a m e . "25 Thus genuine politics, a 
true critical and autonomous response can only be realised outside the political 
universe, the democratic framework. But if this universe, this framework is "revealed" 
as "rigged", who rigged it and in favour of whom? The capitalist classes? All those 
within the system? And why "rigged"? One would think from Marcuse's analysis that 
these outsiders are to be envied, for they are the only truly free! 
Similar questions are raised by the classical statement of Marcuse's position on 
technology and politics: "Today, domination perpetuates and extends itself not only 
through technology but as technology and the latter provides the great legitimation of 
the expanding political power, which absorbs all spheres of culture. In this universe, 
technology also provides the great generalization of the unfreedom of man and 
demonstrates the 'technical' impossibility of being autonomous, of determining one's 
24 I M i , p.52. 25 Ibid.. p.200. 
own life. For this unfircedom appears neither as irrational nor as political, but rather as 
submission to the technical apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life and increases 
the productivity of l a b o r " . 2 6 Here Marcuse refers to the "expanding political power", 
but does not explain whose political power is increasing. Is it the ruling class(es)? If 
so, do they have an autonomy that is denied to everyone else? If not, and they are as 
subject to technological rationality as all the rest, what is the essentially "political" 
nature of their power? Second, and linked to the first point, what exactly is meant by 
domination "as" technology? Is he claiming that the technology itself is inherently 
dominating? If so, how can he claim that the unfreedom is political rather than 
technical? Why the inverted commas around technical? For if the technology is 
inherently dominating, then that can only be seen to be a technical necessity. The key 
problem raised here can be addressed by attention to the ideological nature of science 
and technology. 
It is clear that Marcuse's analysis is ambiguous on the essential issue of whether 
power is exercised by and for particular interests, or whether it is inherent in the system 
of instrumental technical rationality itself. The whole question of the politics of 
technology revolves around this point. While it certainly appears that Marcuse believes 
that the totalitarian nature of technological rationality in advanced industrial societies in 
itself TtndQTS genuine politics impossible, he also wants to maintain a more orthodox 
class analysis: "In the construction of the technological reality, there is no such thing as 
a purely rational scientific order; the process of technological rationality is a political 
p r o c e s s " . 2 7 Technological reality then is politically constructed, and this process is 
controlled by specific interests: "The universal effectiveness and productivity of the 
apparatus under which they are subsumed veil the particular interests that organize the 
apparatus. In other words, technology has become the great vehicle of reification -
reification in its most mature and effective f o r m " . 2 8 
26 Ibid.. p. 130. 27 Ibid.. p. 137. 28 I h i i , pp.137-8. 
Here at one and the same time is the source of and the answer to Marcuse's 
ambiguity. His use of such words as "reification", "legitimation", "appears" and "veil", 
highlights his understanding of the ideological role of science and technology in 
advanced industrial societies, ideology as false consciousness. The ideological use of 
science and technology obscures the political nature of social reality in the name of 
technical imperatives and the provision of material benefits. Yet, Marcuse does not 
examine the nature of the ideological construction involved and, as a result, his 
criticism often tends to confuse the "reality" with the ideology. As he argues that there 
are true and false needs, so Marcuse appears to hold that there is a "true" technology 
and a "false" technology; and that a true liberating technology will be discovered when 
all interests are stripped away and technology is allowed to be technology. 
In fact, Marcuse sometimes seems to suggest, in a vague concession to Marx, 
that the development of "true" technology will result in the disappearance of the 
political. For example, he writes that (in his ideal future) "in constituting themselves 
methodically as political enterprise, science and technology would pass beyond the 
stage at which they were, because of their neutrality, subjected to politics and against 
their intent functioning as political instrumentalities. For the technological redefinition 
and the technical mastery of final causes is the construction, development, and 
utilization of resources (material and intellectual) freed from all particular interests 
which impede the satisfaction of human needs and the evolution of human faculties".^^ 
Interestingly, this would result in all political rationality becoming technical rationality, 
where all political questions will able to be legitimately reinterpreted as technical ones. 
It is not at all clear how this accords with Marcuse's commitment to a genuine politics 
of human autonomy. 
So Marcuse's attitude to the political nature of technology is ambivalent. Jürgen 
Habermas has commented on the ambiguity of Marcuse's analysis arguing that he 
oscillates between "the model of the original sin of scientific-technical progress" and 
29 Ibid.. p.183. 
"that of its innocence".^® Habermas rejects Marcuse's speculations about the 
possibility of a different form of technology because for him, technology is a "project 
of the human species as a whole", a logical outcome of the species characteristic of 
purposive-rational action. As such, "it is impossible to envisage how as long as the 
organization of human nature does not change and as long therefore as we have to 
achieve self-preservation through social labour and with the aid of means that substitute 
for work, we could renounce technology, more particularly our technology, in favour 
of a qualitatively different one".^l The problem is not in the technological project, but 
in the sphere of symbolic interaction where political choices need to be made. For 
Habermas, the key problem of technology for politics is that "it characterizes the 
growing potential of self-surpassing productive forces which continually threaten the 
institutional framework and at the same time, sets the standard of legitimation for the 
production relations that restrict this p o t e n t i a l " . ^ ^ jt is this ideological character of 
technology that has enabled the political sphere of human interaction to be depoliticized. 
The technocratic consciousness permits the social institutions, which are committed to 
political reflection, to be supplanted by a rationality that rightly belongs to the technical 
field. The task is to strengthen the institutional framework against the encroachment of 
such rationality. To stress as Marcuse does, the totalitarian nature of technical 
rationality is for Habermas to accept all too readily the ideology of technology as the 
only reality.33 
The attribution of transformative power to totalitarian technological rationality 
results in politics being understood either as simply one of the totality of processes so 
30 Habermas,!., Towards a Rational Societv (Heinemann, London 1972), p.89. 31 Ibid,, p.87. 32 Ibid., p.89. 33 There are some problems with Habermas's analysis, especially the reducing of the political to the sphere of human interaction, separate from that of purposive-rational action which is the sphere of science and technology. This causes him some difficulty in seeking to arrive at a satisfactory democratic response to technological developments. Cf. particularly Chapter 5 in Ibid.. "The Scientization of Politics". 
transformed and therefore in no way distinctive, or as the most tragic and symbolic 
transformation by virtue of the fact that the political is not so much transformed as 
destroyed in terms of its traditional role as the locus of values, human choice and social 
control. As a result of their understanding of technology as an abstraction, it is 
impossible for the analyses of either Ellul or Marcuse to provide a means by which 
politics and technology might be analysed more concretely. It is essential that more is 
able to be said about the issue than that technical rationality reduces politics to technical 
rationality, with the only hope a genuine non-politics of individuals or outsiders. 
It is significant that Ellul and Marcuse were writing at a time when the end-of-
ideology thesis, associated particularly with Daniel Bell, was current, and in many 
ways their works suggest the same thesis, that social conflict within advanced capitalist 
societies has been rendered impossible as a result of the success of industrialism and 
the perceived domination of technological rationality.̂ "̂  So for them politics comes to 
be understood not as conflict between classes but essentially between the individual and 
the system; the basis of their critique is a commitment to politics as freedom. In neither 
analysis is the dominance of technological rationality understood to be particularly 
unpleasant; in fact it is the very success of technology and industry in satisfying human 
needs, however they might be conceived, that is the central concern. For such material 
satisfaction has been achieved at the cost of genuine human autonomy. 
With the upheavals of the late sixties and early seventies, however, in particular 
the Viemam War and the energy crisis, concerns began to be raised about the emerging 
social costs of science and technology within advanced industrial societies. Technology 
and science were no longer experienced as providing unquestioned material benefits; 
increasing pollution, military technologies, predictions about the extinction of natural 
resources etc. led to a re-examination of the value of the general commitment to science 
and technology. Such developments gave a new vigour to political and social thought, 
which had become to a large degree submerged in the end-of-ideology ideology.^^ 
34 Cf. Larrain, J., The Concept of Ideologv (Hutchinson, London 1979), pp.204-8. 
35 Cf. A. Maclntyre, "The End of Ideology and the End of the End of Ideology" in 
Against the vSelf Images of the Age. (Duckworth, London, 1971). 
Writings about politics and technology tended to come to focus either on the effects of 
technology on the environment and the place of politics in controlling technology (not 
for the sake of political freedom as such but in order to ensure quality of life) or on 
technology as a key site of class struggle. In general, attention moved from 
technological rationality, as a philosophical or sociological phenomenon, to the politics 
of specific technologies, seen as part of a broader political struggle. For some like 
Daniel Bell, such developments called for a strengthened political sphere, a revitalized 
public culture and a more sophisticated intellectual technology to enable such inevitable 
consequences of technological development to be managed effectively within a 
democratic community. For others, a more radical critique of the whole basis of 
industrialism within capitalism was necessary if the politics of technology were to be 
understood and effective democratic action undertaken. I want to look at two classic 
examples of this latter approach, which is more relevant to our discussion in that it 
claims to place the technology itself at the centre of its analysis. 
David Dickson 
In 1974, David Dickson's Alternative Technologv and the Politics of Technical 
Change was published. This book raised many of the issues that in the intervening 
years have come to dominate discussions about technology and politics. In it Dickson 
attempts to demonstrate that technology is political in that it reflects and embodies the 
prevailing power structures of capitalist society, and yet serves to conceal that fact 
through what he calls the "ideology of industrialism", an ideology which promotes the 
idea "that technology somehow possesses an internal objective logic that determines a 
unique progression from one stage of development to the next. Technology is therefore 
held to remain politically neutral in any particular situation, playing an entirely passive 
role with respect to issues of power and control".^^ 
36 Dickson, D., Alternative Technologv (Fontana, 1974), pp. 41-2. 
At the basis of Dickson's analysis is what he sees as a growing disillusionment 
with technological "progress". The opening sentences capture the tone; "Contemporary 
society is characterised by a growing distrust of technology. The many social benefits 
which technology has helped to bring about are increasingly counterbalanced by the 
social problems associated with its use".^^ He argues that these problems result, not 
only from the uses to which it is put, but also from the nature of the technology itself 
which Dickson understands as "largely determined by social and political factors, of 
which technology can never be considered independent" There could be no stronger 
statement of the argument that "technology is political"; technology is "determined" by 
political factors and can "never" be considered independent of them. To assess its 
validity, however, we must be clear as to Dickson's understanding of technology and 
politics. 
In relation to the first, Dickson moves away from the more macro, 
philosophical perspective of Ellul and Marcuse, of a totalitarian technological 
rationality, to narrow the focus to technology defined as "an abstract concept embracing 
both the tools and machines used by society, and the relations between them implied by 
their use".^^ He makes no distinction between machines and tools, but wants to 
distinguish technology from "technique", understood as "the act of applying 
knowledge, whether directly or with the aid of a tool or machine - that is with the aid of 
an element of technology - to a particular task".40 However the phrase "and the 
relations between them implied by their use" renders the definition far broader than 
tools and machines. In fact, Dickson wants to interpret technology as a social institution 
("in common with the legal or education system"), and further as a "language of social 
action", where the machine is word and technique, speech.^l Yet, this is somewhat 
confusing, for Dickson has already distinguished technique from technology. Here 
37 IMd., p.9. 38 Ibid., pp.9-10. 39IMd.,p.l6. 40 Ibid., p. 17. 41 Cf. pp. 17, 176-7. 
technology, machines and technique are all conflated.42 While the understanding of 
technology as a social language is suggestive, it is unhelpful in providing conceptual 
clarity to an argument about technology as politics, especially as his distinction between 
technique and "technology" suggests that the former, implicitly the application of 
technology, is to be understood as relatively autonomous, an understanding that 
Dickson elsewhere appears to refute ^^ 
What then is Dickson's understanding of "politics"? His argument is 
specifically addressed to the relationship between technology and politics within a 
capitalist framework: "(0)ne can only understand the nature of the technology 
developed in any society by relating it to the patterns of production, consumption and 
general social activity that maintain the interests of the politically dominant section of 
that society. Within capitalist societies, such interests are maintained by hierarchical 
patterns of social organization and accompanying authoritarian forms of social control. 
The validity of collective experience is denied; political power is consolidated in the 
hands of the few at the top, and fragmented between many at the bottom The dominant 
modes of hierarchical organization and authoritarian control... become incorporated in, 
and hence come to coincide with, the technology that is developed by capitalist 
s o c i e t i e s P o l i t i c s here appears virtually impossible as a result of the effective 
domination of the "few at the top" and the denial of the validity of collective experience, 
the stuff of traditional political philosophy. The politics of technology then appears to 
refer primarily to the activity of the dominant class in manifesting their power in and 
through technological development. Politics becomes identified with exploitation. No 
42 Dickson also combines them when referring to altemative technology. He writes; "This technology would embrace the tools, machines and techniques necessary to reflect and maintain non-oppressive and non-manipulative modes of social production...".Otalics added) (p.ll.) 
43 Dickson is in fact vague about the use/abuse model of the analysis of technology ^ d indeed its neutrality. The separation of technology and the autonomy of application would suggest that there is a neutrality in technology. He tends to "hedge his bets". E.g. "I suggest how we must see technology itself as part of the political process - even though isolated machines may play a neutral role in this process - and hence the problems associated with it as resulting as much from the nature of technology as from the way in which it is used", (p. 16) 44 Ibid., p.10-11. 
reference here to political institutions nor to the activities of particular political or social 
movements. Where in this analysis is the opportunity for a more 'genuine' politics? 
Such a crude class analysis in fact renders the political m a r g i n a l . 4 5 
Dickson writes that "perhaps the most direct manifestation of the political nature 
of technological innovation is military technology. This is specifically designed to 
provide the maximum control over opposing political f o r c e s " . 4 6 This would appear to 
imply a broader understanding of the 'political* than it having to do with power and 
social control, although Dickson does not elaborate on who are the 'opposing political 
forces'. While he would want to argue that all modem warfare can be understood as 
resulting from the imperialism inherent in capitalism, military technology pre-dates 
capitalism and can be understood as vital for the interests of the whole community and 
therefore understood as 'political' in a more classical sense. He doesn't then explain in 
what ways such technology is political. He finds it difficult because his main focus is 
on productive technologies and military technology does not fit this model. That there 
might be a 'military-industrial' complex profiting from and exploiting 'defence' 
concems, does not of itself justify speaking so simplistically of military technology as 
'the most direct manifestation of the political nature of technological innovation' under 
capitalism. 
Dickson notes similar problems with industrialization in socialist societies but 
argues that these are due not to any movement of convergence or an end of ideology, 
but to their wholesale adoption of capitalist technology and the failure to recognise that 
the technology embodies capitalist principles. "A general belief in the functional 
interdependence model of technological development, and hence in the ideological 
neutrality of the technology itself, goes far to explaining the duplication in Russia and 
the socialist countries of Eastern Europe of the patterns of industrial development 
followed in the Westem capitalist c o u n t r i e s " . 4 7 While there may be some truth in this 
45 Cf. "Marxism, Democracy and the Public Sphere" in Lassman, P., Politics and 
Social Theorv (Routledge, London 1989). 46 Dickson, Alternative Technolo^v. p.92. 47 Ibid., p.56. 
argument, it does little to support Dickson's contention that technology is largely 
determined by political and social forces and is never independent of them. It could in 
fact be taken to suggest that the Eastern bloc countries were powerless to shape the 
technology in accordance with their political principles, that the technology did function 
independently of them, the very argument Dickson seeks to counter. The central issue 
raised here is what it is that is regarded as being "shaped' or determined. Is there a 
neutral technique that can be shaped one way or another? Are there technical constraints 
within a technology that remain, irrespective of its ideological context? In other words, 
is ideological neutrality a possibility? 
Although Dickson's analysis is ambivalent on this point, I believe that his 
argument suggests that technology can be ideologically neutral. However, he is 
particularly unclear in his discussion of the ideological nature of technology. He writes; 
"My general thesis is that technology plays a political role in society, a role intimately 
related to the distribution of power and the exercise of social control. It does this, I 
maintain, in both a material and an ideological fashion, implying that in both senses 
technological development is essentially a political process. At a material level, 
technology sustains and promotes the interests of the dominant social group of the 
society within which it is developed. At the same time, it acts in a symbolic manner to 
support and propagate the legitimating ideology of this society - the interpretation that is 
placed on the world and on the individual's position in it. Both material and ideological 
factors, I suggest, play an important part in determining the nature of technology 
itself'.48 
However this separation of the material and ideological aspects of technology is 
problematic. As we have seen, for Marcuse and Habermas, it is in the very material of 
technology that its ideological power resides. It would be difficult to see in what other 
way power and social control as embedded in technology could operate, in terms of 
Dickson's argument, if not through the ideological. His problems become evident when 
he writes that "Industrialization has undoubtedly succeeded in substantially raising the 
48 Ibid., p. 10. 
health and standard of living of a large number of the world's population. Its major 
achievements in these directions cannot be denied. But it is important to distinguish the 
essential character of the process of industrialization from the ideology to which it has 
given rise. What the ideology disguises is the degree of political exploitation and 
manipulation that has, in almost all cases, accompanied the industrialization process and 
hence the development of contemporary technology"."^^ Dickson wishes to distinguish 
the ^ideology' and the ^essence' of industrialization, but there is confusion here. What 
is the "essential character" of industrialization? Is it its undeniable achievements or the 
political exploitation involved? Then what is the particular ideology? Is it the 
achievements of industrialization? It can't be, for they are undeniable and undoubted! 
The ideological and the material cannot be so easily separated, and in doing so Dickson 
finds himself oscillating between a critique of industrialization in terms of its social and 
environmental consequences and a critique of the ideology of industrialization in terms 
of its political consequences. And he doesn't demonstrate their inherent connection. 
This becomes clear when he discusses alternative technology. He asks "Is it 
possible to conceive of a technology that is based on non-authoritarian, non-hierarchical 
re la t ionsh ips?"50 He immediately proceeds to discuss numerous alternatives to current 
technology. The problem with this approach is that to suggest a different political 
approach does not necessarily guarantee fewer social and environmental problems; it 
may, but that is a different issue. And of course to suggest an alternative technology is 
not to guarantee a different political framework. He has to choose between whether he 
is committed to a non-authoritarian political structure or alternative technologies. One 
does not imply the other. In fact, it is conceivable that the latter could be implemented 
by non-participatory processes. 
This brings us again to Dickson's understanding of politics and ideology. Dickson 
defines ideology as "a particular interpretation placed on phenomena or events that 
distorts their essential nature in the interest of political ends".^! Thus the political 
49 Ib i i , p.42-3. 50 Ibid., p.95. 51 Ibid, p.41. 
virtually comes to equal the ideological, an argument common to capitalist society 
theorists that there is an ^essential nature', something approximating the truth, which 
can be theoretically arrived at under the right circumstances, and there is ideology, 
which distorts the truth. With ideology we are in the realm of politics. Expose the 
ideology, discover the truth and we get rid of politics! Truth and politics cannot co-
exist. Thus Dickson says: "The political perspective indicated above helps us to make 
sense of the social problems associated with contemporary technology ...Every so 
often the ideological disguise slips and the contradictions it covers stand nakedly 
r e v e a l e d . The suggestion here is that recognizing that technology is political in that it 
reflects capitalist interests helps explain the problems associated with modem 
technology; but does it? Furthermore, if the ideology of industrialism is as powerful as 
Dickson would have us believe, its "disguise" only slipping occasionally, why is it that 
consciousness of its problems is so widespread? 
Dickson does not demonstrate that there is an intrinsic link between the power 
arrangements under capitalism and the problems of modem technology. Nevertheless, 
for the issue to be a political one, it is a political one even if there are no ill-effects of 
technology. If political issues surrounding technology have to do with "the distribution 
of power and the exercise of social control" then the possible negative environmental 
effects of technology, for example, make no difference to the fundamental 
understanding of that issue. The assumption that different control of technology will 
lead to better technology can be seen as essentially a focus on technology for what is at 
stake is not politics per se, but "better" technology. The approach is reduced to a form 
of industrial society theory where the issue is one of providing a politics that can 
control technology more effectively. It is almost a case of a technologically-required 
participatory system: politics organized to ensure a better environment. 
However, politics is then reduced to a one-dimensional politics, where a 
particular consensus will be presumed to exist on the value of a particular approach to 
technology. But this value approach can in itself be seen to be ideological. Thus the 
52 Ibid., p.94. 
question of ideology cannot be seen to be counterposed to truth but to another 
ideology. Whereas Dickson argues that the shaping of alternative technology is a better 
technical solution to contemporary problems and an expression of a non-authoritarian 
politics, it could be argued that his approach is one which also uses an ideology of 
participation to "mask" what is essentially a different approach to technology. If his 
argument that technology cannot be independent of political factors is correct, then 
alternative technology can only result from an alternative politics with its own 
ideological commitments. The argument, for example, that altemative technology might 
be used as a lever to change social relations is not one that Dickson can entertain. For 
him, the politics determines the technology, not the technology the politics. Yet, his 
argument has as its end better solutions to technological problems. In fact, Dickson 
provides far less justification for political change than he does for technical change. 
Dickson is perhaps right when he suggests that truth and politics cannot co-exist, for as 
soon as a group claims truth as opposed to an awareness of the ideological nature of all 
truth claims, then politics is in danger and a new altemative totalitarianism threatens. 
Thus, Dickson's understanding that technology is political because it serves to 
legitimate the power of the dominant class and ensure social control is inadequate. His 
reference to "the dominant class", virtually a crude elite thesis, obscures the variety and 
complexity of power and influence within society. Decisions about technological 
innovation for example cannot be conceived as so one-dimensional. While Dickson 
recognizes that "any explanation requires a political analysis of the contemporary 
State", he doesn't attempt it. This is unfortunate for such an analysis may have exposed 
the weakness in his argument, which is to reduce the political to class struggle (or more 
accurately, capitalist domination) and to ignore the reality of institutional and other 
political arrangements. His primary historical examples are drawn from the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries when state intervention in the economy was minimal. The 
reality of state capitalism today suggests that his reference to the dominant class is too 
imprecise to be of any real value in understanding the more complex politics of 
technological development.53 
It is questionable too how far an adequate understanding of the politics of 
modem technology can be drawn from a model based on technology as industry and 
linked to "the patterns of production, consumption and general social activity" that 
maintain the interests of the dominant class. It makes it difficult to draw out the 
implications of his analysis for such different non-industrial technologies as 
telecommunications or biotechnology.54 Furthermore, Dickson's primary emphasis is 
on politics at the point of production with technology being understood as a means of 
gaining and legitimating control. However, technology is increasingly being 
understood in terms of its role in consumption and distribution, particularly its 
ideological role. In this way, technology can, in fact, be seen to be progressive in that 
its legitimacy depends on its ability to deliver - and this means in social as well as 
material goods.55 However, Dickson doesn't address this issue. It is also interesting to 
note that whereas most of the technologies implicated in Dickson's critique of 
industrialization are essentially production technologies, and as such the traditional site 
of capitalist/worker confrontation, most of his suggested altemative technologies are in 
other realms, such as housing, transport and medicine, where class conflict has not 
been as evident. 
Dickson's argument is valuable in challenging the assumptions of a 
technological determinism which ignores the social and political dynamics involved in 
all technological change, and his book was a pioneering work in this regard. However, 
his perception of politics within a capitalist framework, understood essentially as 
domination, reduces the political to the ideological, the processes by which that 
domination is reproduced. His essentialist approach to the 'stripping away of the veil' 
53 Cf. Gouldner,A., The Dialectic of Ideologv and Technoloev (Macmillan, London 
1976) who, within a marxist perspective, prefers to speak of "the several dominant 
strata" - the "ruling class", the "administrative class" and the "political class" and the 
continual tensions between them. Cf. esp. Chs. 11 and 12. 
54 Cf. Badham, opxit. p.llOf. 
55 Cf. Gouldner, op.cit.. pp.266-7. 
of ideology to discover the ^ truth' of technology, as contained in his programme of 
alternative technology, gives primacy to the 'solution to problems' rather to the 
processes of politics. With his devaluation of political institutions, all Dickson can call 
for is "a simultaneous change...in both political and technological consciousness" 
without any real programme as to how this might be a c h i e v e d . 5 6 
In a very perceptive essay, Langdon Winner attributes the adoption of 
alternative technology programmes to a reaction to the failure of radical politics in the 
late 1960's. In a memorable turn of phrase, he writes, "Stemming from the decline of 
radical politics and from an obvious next step in the critique of technological society, its 
true purpose was not to produce energy from renewable sources, but to generate the 
hope of social renewal from the winds of d e s p a i r " . 5 7 While Dickson's work is much 
more aware of the realities of the politics of technology than many involved in 
alternative technology, there is nevertheless an ambivalence about the political that 
makes Winner's observation relevant to his work. 
Harry Braver man 
In the same year as Dickson's Alternative Technologv. Harry Braverman 
published Labor and Monopolv Capital, subtitied "The Degradation of Work in the 
Twentieth Century". This work has become a classic in the radical analysis of 
technology and the labour process. Like Dickson, Braverman argues that within a 
monopoly capitalist framework, the development and introduction of technology serves 
to reinforce the control of capital over labour, particularly through the strategy of 
deskilling. 
While Braverman does not discuss the 'politics' of technology explicitly, his 
thesis has been very influential in discussions about the social and political shaping of 
technology, and is therefore worthy of examination. Of particular interest is his 
56 Ii2ii p.95. 57 Winner, L., "Building the Better Mousetrap" in The Whale and the Reactor. p.70. 
interpretation of the role of technology within society and his discussion on the nature 
of flexibility in the development of technologies. 
Following Marx, Braverman reflects somewhat of an ambivalence towards 
science and technology. He believes "that the transformation of the labor processes 
from their bases in tradition to their basis in science is not only inevitable but necessary 
for the progress of the human race and for its emancipation from hunger and other 
forms of need".58 Indeed he argues that the Marxist view "is hostile not to science and 
technology as such, but only to the manner in which these are used as weapons of 
domination in the creation, perpetuation, and deepening of a gulf between class in 
s o c i e t y . T h u s there is a science and technology "as such" which is in itself 
emancipatory and progressive, and there is a science and technology which is "used" to 
dominate and exploit. We have ahready had occasion to notice this ambivalence in the 
analyses of Marcuse and Dickson as to whether the technology itself is political or 
whether its particular application reflects the politics. And again, we have to ask, what 
is this "essential' technology and how does it differ qualitatively from that which is 
used for "domination"? 
For Braverman, the necessary emancipatory context is that in which "for the 
worker, craft satisfaction that arises from conscious and purposeful mastery of the 
labor process will be combined with the marvels of science and the ingenuity of 
engineering, an age in which everyone will be able to benefit, in some degree, from this 
combination".^^ However, placing the mastery of the labour process on one side and 
the employment of science and engineering on the other implies that there is a 
separation of the two, that science and engineering are neutral and that their application 
will be determined by the demands of the labour process, a use that will automatically 
ensure craft satisfaction. Braverman does not make clear how far the very nature of 
science and engineering are affected by the labour process involving engineers and 
58 Braverman, H., T.abour and Mnnopolv Capitalism (Monthly Review Press, New 
York 1974,) p.61 59 Ibid. 60 IW(L, p.7. 
scientists. Certainly his use of "marvels" and "ingenuity" suggests that these disciplines 
have significant social autonomy. 
What does Braverman understand technology to be? There is litde complexity in 
his definition; it is for all intents and purposes synonymous with "machinery'. As was 
noted above, Braverman does not discuss politics as such. Consistent with his marxist 
perspective, his central focus is not technology and politics, but technology and 
society. He argues that the problem of understanding the nature of technology within 
capitalism "can be fruitfully attacked only by way of concrete and historically specific 
analysis of technology and machinery on the one side and social relations on the other, 
and of the manner in which these two come together in existing societies".^! 
Braverman's emphasis on historical case studies here serves as a correction to the more 
philosophical critiques that we have discussed e a r l i e r . ^ ^ However, where Dickson 
argued that technology had no independence of social and political factors, Braverman 
here argues for a conceptual separation of technology and society that is difficult for his 
developing argument to sustain. 
This confusion becomes evident when Braverman discusses tl>e ways in which 
machinery might be classified. "Machines may be defined, classified, and studied in 
their evolution according to any criteria one wishes to select: their motive power, their 
complexity, their use of physical principles etc. But one is forced at the outset to choose 
between two essentially different modes of thought. The first is the engineering 
approach, which views technology primarily in its internal connections and tends to 
define the machine in relation to itself, as a technical fact. The other is the social 
approach, which views technology in its connection with humanity and defines the 
machine in relation to human labor, and as a social artifact".^^ Braverman appears to 
accept that either choice has validity depending on one's purpose, and that each analysis 
61 Ibid., p. 17. ^ 
62 Ironically, however, Braverman has been criticised for his failure to provide the empirical material necessary to support his deskilling thesis. Wilkinson argues that it is impossible to generalize about the effects of new technology on the nature of work. Cf. Wilkinson, B., The Shopfloor Politics of New Technolo^ (Heinemann, London, 1983). 63 Braverman, op.cit.. p. 184. 
can be relatively self-contained. However, it is obvious that Braverman prefers to adopt 
the social approach and understand technology as a social artifact. But, if that is so, 
how can he speak of a "technology-as-such"? Does Braverman want to hold that there 
are legitimate "technical" issues involved and choose to ignore them? Or does he want 
to claim that all technologies are ultimately "social artifacts"? 
Braverman appears to want to hold onto the validity of the central emancipatory 
role that Marx saw for technology in a socialist society. For him, technology in 
capitalist society has been distorted by capitalist relations; thus he needs to maintain a 
conceptual separation between "technical technology" and "social technology". So he 
writes, "The analysis of the machine by means of purely technical characteristics, such 
as its power source, the scientific principles it employs, etc., may yield much 
information of value to engineers, but this study of the machine "in itself has little 
direct value for a comprehension of its social role".^^ There appears to be an 
underlying assumption that technologies under capitalism are social artifacts, whereas 
in the new order, technology will return to being "purely technical", "machinery-in-
itself. 
The history of technology is for Braverman the story of progressive deskilling, 
a process by which the potential for control over the constraints of the labour process 
which technology possesses and the associated benefits promised for humankind have 
been subverted by capitalism. "The mass of humanity is subjected to the labor process 
for the purposes of those who control it rather than for any general purposes of 
"humanity" as such ... Thus in addition to its technical function of increasing the 
productivity of labor - which would mark machinery under any social system -
machinery also has in the capitalist system the function of divesting the mass of 
workers of their control over their own l a b o r " . ^ ^ 
64 Ibid., p. 186. 
65 Ibid., p. 193. There are suggestions here of Habermas's two spheres of rationalization - work and interaction, the purposive-rational and the communicative. As we have noted (n.33), Habermas has been criticized for conceptualizing the purposive-rational as separate from the practical and therefore politically neutral; a "species-project". Braverman is open to the same criticism. Cf. Habermas, op.cit., pp.91-2. 
However, the irony for Braverman is that this control, while being social, 
results from technical possibilities within the technology itself. So he can write that "it 
is in the nature of machinery, and a corollary of technical development, that the control 
over the machine need no longer be vested in its immediate operator. This possibility is 
seized upon by the capitalist mode of production and utilized to the fullest e x t e n t . " 6 6 
The question however remains how far it is possible for technology to be so shaped as 
to serve the interests of control. Is technology infinitely malleable in terms of its 
applications? Is it possible for there to be no technical possibility to exploit? And is it 
possible for the technical and the social to oppose each other? If so, then technology 
must be understood as having a reality independent of its final embodiment in a 
machine, for the machine could have been different. Braverman acknowledges this but 
is vague on how he understands the process; "Considered only in their physical aspect, 
machines are nothing but developed instruments of production whereby humankind 
increases the effectiveness of labor ...But within the framework of capitalist social 
relations, all this is reversed. The means of production become the property of the 
capitalist ...The purely physical relationship assumes the social form given it by 
capitalism and itself begins to be altered".^^ But what does this mean? How does the " 
social form" differ from the "physical aspect"? 
Braverman's thesis has been criticized by a number of authors, not least for his 
failure to take into account levels of resistance to capitalist activity within industry as 
well as capitalist motivations other than that of control.68 At the same time, his failure 
to discuss the political context or to suggest proposals for change is understandable in 
terms of his marxist perspective.^^ His significance for our discussion however is in 
66 Ibid., p. 194. 67 Ibid., p.227. In this connection, Braverman attacks Ellul for attributing power to the machine rather than to the social milieu of capitalism in which the technology was embedded. He criticizes "Ellul's artificial view ... which is constructed on every level to exonerate capitalism; perhaps this accounts for its being so fashionable in liberal circles". p.229n. .. ^ . , , 
68 e.g. T.Elger, "Valorization and Deskilling: A Critique of Braverman , Capital and 
ClMS (NO.7, Spring 1979) . 69 Braverman does discuss the state bnefiy but m conventional marxist terms ot reducing it to a tool of capital. This is not particularly helpful in assessing the politics of the particular situation (pp.284ff) He also discusses proposals for worker control but 
the problems he has with the flexibility of technology and the claims to "social 
shaping". If technology is said to play a political role in society, then the nature of the 
technical and its relationship to the social or political must be clarified. In conceptually 
separating them, affirming the validity of the autonomy of the technical and the social, 
Braverman does not provide us with the necessary tools. 
This survey has highlighted a number of problems in attempting to develop an 
understanding of what is meant when it is argued that technology is political. First, it is 
clear that what constitutes "politics" is problematic. For some, "politics" is restricted to 
those activities to do with the state rather than any and every activity to do with power. 
For those committed to a more radical critique of capitalist society, however, the 
concept of "politics" expands to cover the exercise of class power in any of its 
particular social manifestations. Furthermore, the particular interpretation adopted will 
determine whether the "political" is understood descriptively or pejoratively, as the 
focal point of public life or as a conspiracy expressive of capitalism. 
Second, the "politics of technology" can refer to the nature of choice and control 
in the shaping of technology, or alternatively to the loss of choice and control to 
technology. As we have seen, many critics tend to oscillate between the two 
perspectives; the key issue here comes then to be the definition of "technology". 
For those who are concerned with the decline of the political and the loss of 
control in the "technological society", technology is generally understood to be either a 
"spirit" of technical rationality or the constellations of technical systems. For those for 
whom technology embodies the power and nature of the structural forces which shape 
it, technology tends to be understood in terms of artifacts, apparatus and techniques. 
The key problem for those who believe that under capitalism technologies have been 
dismisses most proposals as "delusory". Real worker control "has as its prerequisite the demystifying of technology and the reorganization of the mode of production". (p.445n) How far Braverman's thesis contributes to such démystification is questionable. 
constructed to deskill and oppress, is to demonstrate the inherent flexibility of these 
technologies and at the same time, the existence of an "essential" technology which is 
ideologically neutral. The question as to how far technical constraints determine the 
choices available for technological development is a central one, and one about which 
there appear to be a good number of unsupported assumptions. 
As Winner draws on the insights of these authors, many of these problems 
become his too. As has been suggested, his analysis provides somewhat of a synthesis 
of the perspectives discussed in this chapter. His concentration on technology itself 
owes much to Ellul and Marcuse, but he concentrates more explicidy on what he 
understands to be the political ramifications of technology. On the other hand, in his 
later work, his perspective appears to come closer to that of Dickson and Braverman, 
and yet to go further than them, with his claim that technologies can be understood as 
political phenomena in their own right. For him, only in this way is it possible to 
justify adopting technology itself as a focus of political study. However, it will be 
argued that this synthesis renders his analysis problematic. Winner's key difficulty is 
that he is explicitly committed to a position which wants to assert the primacy of politics 
as an activity constitutive of public life, while at the same time wanting to argue that 
technology itself has politics and has in fact supplanted the political in contemporary 
society. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Langdon Winner I: Autonomous Technology 
Langdon Winner came to prominence in the field of science and technology 
studies in 1977 with the publication of Autonomous Technology. As its sub-title 
"Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought" suggests, this work 
examines the relationship between technology and political theory, more specifically the 
question as to whether it is possible to speak of the possibility of politics in an age of 
mass technological systems. While his argument draws heayily on Ellul and Marcuse,, 
he claims that they are inclined to oyerstate the case in treating technology as a 
"uniyocal phenomenon" 1- This chapter will argue that Winner's analysis in 
Autonomous Technology in fact suffers from the same problem. His understanding of 
technology is so broad as to render a consideration of politics almost impossible. In 
particular, it is difficult to see how his theory of technological politics differs to any 
significant degree from their analyses of the loss of human autonomy in the face of 
widespread technological imperatiyes. 
In reaction to analyses, like those of Dickson and Brayerman, which focus on 
the determining nature of the political and social relations which surround technological 
deyelopment and which thereby imply the possibility of a different technology within a 
different political context, Winner argues that no conyentional political theory, marxist 
or liberal, is adequate in addressing the problem of technology for contemporary 
political life. These theories traditionally posit the existence of particular political groups 
or institutions which control technological deyelopments; but modern experience 
demonstrates such an understanding to be patentiy false. "What we lack is our 
bearings. The contemporary experience of things technological has repeatedly 
confounded our vision, our expectations, and our capacity to make intelligent 
judgements. Categories, arguments, conclusions, and choices that would haye been 
1 Cf. Winner, L., Autonomous Technology (M.I.T., Cambridge, 1977), p. 130. 
entirely obvious in earlier times are obvious no longer".^ What Winner attempts is an 
analysis which takes the constraints of technology as the key problem for modem 
political theory. However, as will be seen, Winner's understanding of what constitutes 
both technology and traditional political theory is problematic and as a result tends to 
contribute to the very reality he is describing - the submerging of the political in the 
technological. Here, as for EUul and Marcuse, technology is political because it 
eliminates the need for politics. 
While it is not the intention of this chapter to make a full analysis of Winner's 
argument in Autonomous Technologv. there are a number of key issues that are 
addressed there, an understanding of which are essential for an adequate analysis of his 
later, more developed work. These issues centre particularly on his understanding of 
the very terms "technology" and "politics" and the nature and development of his 
"theory of technological politics".^ 
Winner's understanding of "technology" 
Winner begins by justifying his decision to focus on technology as the central 
problem for modem political theory. He argues tiiat "in one disguise or another, 
technology has been a central theme in political thought for the past two hundred years. 
Although the definition of the issue of concern has again and again shifted, it has been 
clear during tiiis time that there is something in the nature of modem technology 
thinkers can ill afford to ignore".^ He cites as examples of this "disguise" of 
technology issues such as the industrial revolution, the rise of industrial society. 
3 It is important here to note the difficulty in Autonomous TççhnQlpgy of knowing 
when Winner speaks with his own voice or that of the authors he is surveying. 
Certainly, the theory of technological politics is his term for a central theme m the 
literature he surveys in his book; as will be seen below, in his later work, it appears to 
become his own theoretical formulation. 
4Ibid., p.2. 
working class discontent and alienation. However, for Winner, "technology itself has 
seldom been a primary subject matter for social or political inquiries".^ 
Now, the phrase "technology itself" is extremely significant for the 
understanding of his argument. He suggests that technology itself as "subject matter" is 
a focus that has been neglected in studies of industrial society, the emergence of elites, 
alienation etc. even though "technology has been a central theme". What then is the 
distinction that Winner wishes to make here between "central theme" and "primary 
subject matter"? It clearly hinges on the meaning of the phrase "technology itself. In 
fact, it is on the validity of his claims to be taking "technology itself seriously, and as 
central to his analysis, that the distinctiveness of his contribution would appear to 
depend. 
For Winner, contemporary debates which do centre on technology itself tend to 
interpret it in terms of economics, economic history or the technical sphere alone. As 
such they are inadequate. They reflect a truncated understanding of the role of 
technology in modern society, an understanding which ignores the fact that 
technology's "structures, processes, and alterations enter into and become part of the 
structures, processes and alterations of human consciousness, society and politics".^ 
Here Winner's argument suggests a broad cultural perspective on technology that, 
following Ellul and Marcuse, appears to view technology as a technical rationality 
totalitarian in its implications for the human personality and for society as a whole. This 
is a surprisingly broad understanding of technology in the light of his claims to be 
narrowing the focus from industrial society, alienation etc. to technology itself. Where 
is the technology itself in this broad understanding? As there is clearly some suggestion 
of conceptual separation between, for example, alienation and technology itself, how is 
this maintained in the face of such an understanding of technology as the alteration of 
consciousness? 
5VM. 
6 Ibid., p.6. 
Surprisingly, Winner does not explicitly deal with this question. He argues that 
he is not so much concerned with definitional precision as with the ways in which the 
meaning of the word "technology" has changed and broadened over the last century. 
While recognizing that "technology" is in danger of coming to mean everything, and 
therefore nothing, he nevertheless finds more interest for an understanding of the 
current dilemmas surrounding technology in noting the "chaotic" uses of the word 
rather than in attempting a formal definition. "For those who would listen to language 
rather than perform elaborate operations on it, this annoying symptom will not be taken 
as an occasion to impose an arbitrary definition. It should be seen as an interesting 
sign".7 
However, Winner himself argues that "technology itself hsis seldom been a primary 
subject matter" for political inquiry. The use of such a phrase makes claims to some 
sort of exclusiveness in concept, the implication being that there is an "essential 
technology" and that there are categories that are not to be considered "technology" or, 
if so, then only peripherally. It is extremely important that we be clear about what it is 
that distinguishes discussion of "technology itself from discussion about such things 
as the rise of industrial society, the misery of the working class or alienation. Until that 
is clear, there seems little of distinctiveness in Winner's argument. 
Recognizing that some conceptual clarity is required. Winner outlines a four-
fold distinction which forms the basis of his discussion of technology: 
i) apparatus - "tools, instruments, machines, appliances, weapons, gadgets - which 
are used in accomplishing a wide variety of tasks...the physical devices of technical 
performance" 
ii) technique - "skills, methods, procedures, routines - that people engage in to 
accomplish tasks ... purposive, rational, step-by-step way of doing things" 
iii) organization - "some(but not all) varieties of social organization - factories, 
workshops, bureaucracies, armies, research and development teams...all varieties of 
technical(rational-productive) social arrangements" 
iv) network - "Those large-scale systems that combine people and apparatus linked 
across great distances".^ 
Now these may be helpful distinctions in heightening awareness of the variety 
of dimensions in a broad understanding of technology, but they are of little value in 
enabling us to determine with any clarity what is understood by "technology itself', for 
either all four categories are to be included in any discussion of technology, which then 
confirms Winner's own criticism that technology comes to mean everything, and 
therefore nothing, or else they are to be examined individually, in which case no 
generalizations about technology are possible. 
This is particularly true when attempting to develop an understanding of the 
political nature of technology. So, for example, the categories of "organization" and 
"network" are problematic whichever level of analysis is undertaken. If one 
incorporates into the understanding of "technology" the very social arrangements in 
which the "apparatus" is embedded, then there is a great deal of difference in the 
meaning of such a concept as "autonomous technology" than if only the apparatus is 
meant. Even more important is the implication of this distinction that the social 
relationships of a technology are to be understood as essentially "technical" 
relationships rather than as social or political. Is "industry" then to be understood as a 
component of "technology itself"? Are social constructions such as "factory", 
"bureaucracy" and "research-teams" to be seen as "technology itself? If so, then it is 
difficult to see the distinctiveness of Winner's contribution to the technology debate; 
certainly his claim to be narrowing the perspective would appear to be spurious, for, as 
we have seen, an analysis essentially identifying technology with "the factory" and 
"industry" had already been attempted by Dickson. If, on the other hand, 
"organization" and "network" are analysed as categories distinct from "apparatus" and 
"technique", then it is difficult to see what is distinctive about "technology itself for 
SIbid., PP-11-12. 
social and political analysis, for the social and political organization of a technical 
environment will then be understood as being distinct and separate from the hardware. 
What one is left with ,then, common to these "distinctions", is simply the word 
"technology" . However, this is a problem when one tries to develop an analysis of the 
politics of technology that will be applicable to such diverse "technologies" as 
biotechnology, manufacturing technologies and communications. What is it that they 
have in common, what is it that enables us to call them "technology"? Generally, what 
most political analyses of these technologies have in common are assumptions about 
particular power elites which develop and apply the technology for their own interests. 
Ironically, however, this is the very type of analysis which Winner asserts he is trying 
to balance by reference to "technology itself'. Yet his own use of the term "technology" 
doesn't enable us to identify the "technology itself' in these examples in a way that 
would enable us to make any useful theoretical generalizations. What we are left with is 
either an analysis of elites, which virtually ignores the technology, or a micro-analysis 
of the technology, which has little value for a broader understanding of the politics of 
technology generally. It is probably for these reasons that Winner in fact rarely uses 
these distinctions in the body of his argument; the key phrases which recur are 
"technical-systems", "technics" or "technology". In fact. Winner even sub-titled his 
book, "Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought", "technics" rather 
than "technology". It is also probably the reason that his later, more refmed argument 
asks "Do artifacts have politics?" This is a key point and I will return to it below. 
Winner's definition of "politics" 
The second issue of definition in Winner's analysis is the meaning of politics 
and political theory. As a result of his determination to follow Ellul and Marcuse in 
providing a comprehensive analysis of the framework of technology. Winner tends to 
use "political", "social" and "cultural" almost interchangeably. It is in fact interesting 
that although his book's subtide refers to "political thought", most of the literature he 
surveys comes, in fact, from social scientists, philosophers or novelists. While this of 
course is quite valid, it does show that his understanding of "political thought" is quite 
broad. Nevertheless, as his stated concern is with the implications of technology for 
political theory, it needs to be clarified what he means by "politics" and "political 
theory", as opposed, for example, to "culture" and "society". 
Interestingly, Winner's understanding of politics is no more precise in terms of 
definition than is his treatment of "technology". This is not surprising considering that 
"politics" is such a contested concept.^ We have already noticed the range of 
interpretations in the previous chapter. However, while lack of precision may be 
understandable, lack of consistency is less so. As we will see. Winner operates 
primarily within an American political perspective and constantly wants to reduce 
politics to democratic politics. Furthermore, he tends to conflate politics and political 
theory with the result that his discussion of the practice of politics in relation to 
technology and questions of political theory in relation to technology become 
unhelpfully intertwined. 
Winner's discussion of the implications of technology for politics begins with 
the acknowledgement that the understanding that technology is political is not a 
radically new idea but in fact one that is widely held. "Technological change is now 
widely recognized as political insofar as its effects are ubiquitous, touch everyone in 
society, and can, therefore, be understood as "public" in a distinctly modem sense. 
Understood in this fashion, political questions concerning technology abound at every 
turn". Politics then can be understood in part as being constituted by a shared and 
"public" experience of a particular phenomenon. Technology, then, is understood to be 
political because its effects are experienced by all sections of society within a public 
context and as such enter the political arena. However, for Winner, this widespread 
understanding of the "political" significance of technology is not adequate for a 
comprehensive understanding of the implications of technology for politics for it 
9 Cf. the discussion of the term "essentially contested concept" in Connolly, W.E., Thft Terms nf Political Discourse (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1983), Ch.l. 
10 ¡bid., P'135. 
narrows the conception of the political to a mere preoccupation with "effects" and post-
facto evaluation and experience. 
Of vastly greater significance for Winner is the fact that science and technology 
are progressively usurping the role that he understand! was traditionally filled by 
politics. Technology is political in that both technology and politics are concerned 
essentially with the exercise of power. "The concern of science and technology with the 
possibilities of control have often found expression in terms which closely parallel the 
language of politics. This is perhaps not surprising if one recalls that both politics and 
technics have as their central focus the sources and exercise of power." 11 
Politics and technics then come to be seen as competitors for power and control 
within a society. The difference for Winner is that technics brings with it a particular 
model of power: - that of "master-slave". Other possible alternative political responses 
are rendered invalid by the triumph of technics. "Our thinking about technology, 
however seems inextricably bound to a single conception of the manner in which power 
is used - the style of absolute mastery, the despotic, one way control of the master over 
the slave. Other notions, central to the historical discussion of political power -
membership, participation, and authority founded on consent - seem to have no 
relevance in this sphere. In our traditional ways of thinking, the concept of mastery and 
the master-slave metaphor are the dominant ways of describing man's relationship to 
nature, as well as to the implements of technology".^^ 
11 Ibid., p.20. It is important,at this point, to recognize tiiat this reification of science and technology as "having power" is part of Winner's rhetorical method. His discussion of autonomous technology is not a crude anthropomorphism. "I would be the first to admit that the approach I have chosen is one sided and that it excludes much that is important in political and social life. I would also allow that there are some very real dangers in the view that technology and science are autonomous. ... my justification in taking the present approach is that there are some significant questions here that the more obvious ways of talking about politics and technology have been prone to ignore. One way of raising these issues from concealment is to begin by looking at them in their most vivid outlines, "(p. 18) While accepting that Winner is using the broad brush however, we should nevertheless be aware of those realities which may be concealed by such an approach. 
12 Ibid., p.20. 
Winner appears to be suggesting tiiat structures of thinking about technology in such 
a one-dimensional framework as "master-slave" become the structures for thinking 
about politics. Habermas suggests something similar when he argues that "we are no 
longer able to distinguish between practical and technical power... therefore a peculiar 
danger arises when the process of scientification trangresses the limit of technical 
questions, without, however, departing from the level of reflection of a rationality 
confined to the technological horizon". Faced with the power of technical 
possibilities, then, traditional political theory, concemed with questions of participation 
and consensus, is rendered irrelevant. But how does Winner understand this process? 
Does he see it to be essentially a function of ideology, as Habermas and Marcuse do? 
While his language suggests so, his argument does not. 
Winner would want to attribute these developments to technology, and yet, in 
the language of the passage above, it is not "technology" that imposes this one-
dimensional form of control on society, but that "our thinking", (as well as "notions" 
and "conceptions") about technology is bound to that "metaphor". What seems to be a 
focus on "technology itself in fact becomes for Winner an issue of "thinking about 
technology". If this were pursued, important questions might be raised about the 
sources of "our thinking", the ideology and the power relations involved in the shaping 
of social and political thought. It is not clear, in fact, whetiier tiie shaping of "our" 
thinking is an example of the inherentiy consciousness-structuring processes of 
technology or the result of specific political and social arrangements. Certainly 
Winner's use of "our" serves to obscure the political. He refers, for example, to "our 
tiiinking about technology...". Who is the "our"? The implication is that there is an 
unproblematic, generalized thinking about technology within society that transcends 
specific commitments, interests and perspectives or particular inequalities in power and 
influence. If this were true, such a consensus would ironically deny the very necessity 
of politics. At the same time, he fails to explore the ideological nature of this assumed 
13 Habermas, J., Theorv and Practice (Heinemann, London 1974), p.255. In 
Habermas's usage, "practical" is synonymous with "political". 
universal "consensus". As with Ellul and Marcuse, the essential politics centres on the 
tension between not particular interest groups, but the system and the democratic "us". 
Yet, Winner is not blind to the existence of competing interests within the 
political community. While his understanding of politics is one essentially emphasising 
public participation and consensus, his understanding of power appears be quite 
different, involving a more radical awareness of the role of existing power structures 
and the reality of conflict within industrialized society. Nevertheless, it is not clear that 
he regards the exercise of such power as "political" in quite the same way as public 
participation and consensus. 
For example, early in the book. Winner refers to the anticipated response to his 
analysis of those who explicitly benefit from technological change. "Persons who feel 
sufficiently empowered by the technological systems of our time will find such 
observations of litde help ... My hope is that there will be at least a few to whom the 
theme will make sense and who will want to consider it".l^ Winner here clearly 
recognizes that there are groups in society who have power in relation to technological 
change and who will thus not share his criticisms. Furthermore, he suggests that those 
who do understand his arguments may then be in a position to do something about 
them. This surely implies that potential conflict, interest-dominated activity and 
inequality of power are still important elements in any realistic assessment of politics in 
an age of technics. As has been suggested, what Winner appears to be really addressing 
is not so much the decline of politics in technological society, but the decline of 
democratic politics. 
Winner appears to hold that the master-slave metaphor of technics has become 
the dominant metaphor of political life in a technological age, and that, as a result, 
democratic principles are undermined. While Winner does not elaborate on tiie ways in 
which the metaphor is actually reflected in the technology itself, it could be argued tiiat 
his own understanding of politics and power essentially reflects that very metaphor. 
This particular model of power focusses very much on control. Central to Winner's 
14 Winner, Autonomous Technologv. p.30. 
whole argument is the question of the possibilities for the control of technology in a 
democratic environment; it is a search for limits. The master-slave metaphor then can be 
said to be very apposite in describing his position. The master, the sovereign, is to be 
"the people", "us". 
The problem with technology then can be seen to be not so much its metaphor 
of power, but its challenge to the sovereignty of "the people". As long as technology is 
"slave" to the "master", the "people", it would seem that Winner would be content. 
Why then he should see the master-slave metaphor, as it is embodied in technics, as a 
threat to democratic politics is not clear. The central issue for Winner is what he 
understands to be the contemporary struggle between technics and (democratic) politics 
for sovereignty over the structure of social life. It is interesting to note that Bernard 
Crick argues that "not merely the concept of ^sovereignty of the people' is un- or even 
anti-political, but also the whole doctrine of s o v e r e i g n t y " . ^^ This raises questions 
about Winner's understanding of the nature of democratic politics, an issue to which I 
will retum below. 
Central to Winner's thesis about "technics-out-of-control" is technological 
determinism, a concept which forms the basis of his theory of technological politics. It 
is here that the problems raised by the ambiguity in Winner's understanding of 
technology and politics become apparent. 
Technological Determinism 
Winner argues that there are characteristics of modem technological systems 
that justify him claiming that they are "out-of-control". These characteristics include, 
among others, the momentum of technological change that has become equated with 
modernization, the unanticipated consequences of particular "chosen" technologies and 
those technological imperatives that demand the restructuring of their particular 
environments. In each of these cases, the technological developments almost take on a 
15 Crick, B., In Defence of Politics (Penguin, Harmondsworth 1982), p.61. 
life of their own as a result. Winner seems to believe, of political inaction. "Each case 
combines an objective state of affairs - an actual process in the world - with a 
predisposition of men in society to allow the change to continue with little intervention. 
Together, the process and the disposition create what can be called technological 
dynamism, a forceful movement in history which continues largely without conscious 
human guidance. This is not to say that changes in technology and society are never 
chosen, directed or controlled...The point is that there are important categories of 
change that simply do not make sense under the ideas of 'chosen' or 'voluntary'." 
Winner then attributes technological dynamism to a combination of the technical 
developments and a "predisposition of men (sic)" to allow them. What results is a 
technological system which severely limits, and in fact renders meaningless, claims 
about the possibility of political choice and control. 
How valid is such an argument and how far does such a concept contribute to a 
more sophisticated understanding of the political nature of technology? In the first 
place. Winner raises the issue of the human "predisposition" to not intervene in 
technological change as though it was some kind of anthropological fact. What is this 
predisposition? Is it psychological, biological or social? Where is the evidence for such 
a claim? If it is based on political observation, then questions need to be asked about the 
nature and source of this situation, in particular the relationship between technology and 
ideology. Secondly, with his reference to "human" control, Winner continues to 
suggest a universal consciousness about technology which leads him to ignore the 
dynamics of real politics. As he has acknowledged, some groups are empowered by 
technological change. Therefore, questions need to be asked about why some groups 
who may have real concerns about certain technological developments have not the 
power to be able to gain a hearing or influence developments, and why, in particular, 
the various democratic institutions are failing to provide the necessary scrutiny. 
How useful then is Winner's discussion of technological determinism as a 
means of developing a more adequate understanding of the relationship between 
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technology and politics. Winner draws heavily on Marx, not so much his analysis of 
the inherent contradictions of capitalism, but his insights concerning the link between 
the productive forces of a society and the development of modes of life and 
consciousness. "Marx calls our attention to the fact that each generation is strongly 
conditioned or informed by a technological inheritance that it in no sense ^chose'. While 
it is always possible that a particular generation might wish to review this inheritance, 
scrutinize the pattems that technics gives to life, and make new choices on the basis of 
this critique, such a procedure is not in fact something that occurs to anyone to do. In 
the main, the socio-technical context into which we are bom must simply be accepted as 
g i v e n " . However, Winner takes Marx too far here in suggesting the result of such a 
situation is an enforced passive acceptance. Furthermore, it could be argued that he 
sacrifices a political analysis in favour of a cultural analysis, a confusion noted 
previously. 
There are two different points to be made here. No-one would quibble with the 
argument that social and technical development is historical, that human beings are bom 
into existing socio-technical frameworks and that such frameworks constrain the range 
of possible decisions that can be made within them. In questioning Winner's apolitical 
determinism, I am not making claims to complete metaphysical autonomy or technical 
mastery . There are significant social, economic, technical and political limitations that 
constrain action. The issue becomes one of the extent and nature of those constraints. 
In a socio-technical framework, it needs to be determined how far the social and 
political arrangements are "given" or constrained by technical considerations, and how 
far they are politically and ideologically constructed and reproduced. However, Winner 
wants to go further than this and claim that such frameworks, in and of themselves, 
prevent review, scrutiny and modification. Winner is not claiming such action is in 
theory impossible but rather that it is rendered impossible by the socio-technical 
framework itself. He fails to explain how this process operates. This is the totalitarian 
technical rationality of Marcuse in which human autonomy, and therefore politics, is 
17 IMd., p.83. 
impossible at every level. Moreover, it is again not clear here in what way "technology 
itself is the focus. As was noted above, assertions of the shaping of consciousness by 
"technology" are not particularly helpful in providing a subject for political analysis. It 
would in fact render such analysis impossible. As was the case with Marcuse, it is 
difficult to see how Winner was able to develop such a critical perspective and 
scrutinize technics so closely if such a totalitarian rationality was indeed a reality. 
However, a litde further in his discussion. Winner appears to change direction 
and admit that human actors, such as inventors, entrepreneurs, and managers, do 
indeed make significant decisions. He uses Aristotle Onassis as an example. "Aristotle 
Onassis did decide to build a fleet of supertankers. Those who designed and built the 
ships made choices about their physical characteristics and the social organization of 
work on board". Here we are on firmer ground, so to speak. We have an artifact - a 
ship, a more concrete example of "technology itself. While Winner admits that it is the 
case that only a few have the power to make those decisions that affect the many, he 
argues that what is even more significant is that results occur which no-one chooses. 
"For example, when a badly constructed supertanker breaks up on the shoals, 
spreading oil on the beaches, we must understand the event has something to do with 
decades of technical and social change that created the circumstances for the calamity. 
But does it make any sense to say, as the voluntarist argument suggests that we "chose" 
the design of the ships, the form of Onassis's corporation, the social and political 
conditions under which the boats sail, or the eventual crack-up? When we think back 
on it, we do not remember being c o n s u l t e d " . ^^ Here reappears the confusion in 
Winner's argument over the nature of "politics". He sets up the voluntarist straw 
argument to easily knock it down. No one would want to deny that there are unforeseen 
consequences to decisions about technology. But that is not an factor unique to 
technology nor technical decisions. Furthermore, to argue for human choice and control 
in technological decisions is not to argue that "we" chose, but that "someone" chose. 
18 Il2id., p.85. 19 ¡ M i 
Winner's analysis of the exercise of political power comes down to "we were not 
consulted", that there was no "democratic" choice. 
This view represents a version of the "black-box" approach to existing political 
and technical reality. It abstracts the technology from its historical context. The 
implication is that as there was no obvious democratic decision-making in the 
developments surrounding the supertanker, then politics collapsed before the 
technological imperatives involved in the task. However as we have seen, technology-
out-of-democratic-control is not the same as technology-out-of-control. In the case of 
the supertanker, decisions about quality control, the size of vessels, the primacy of 
profit, the nature of energy supplies, the power of big business and the nature of risk 
were made and are being made continually within the context of social and political life. 
While it may be true that these were decisions made progressively over previous 
decades. Winner nowhere demonstrates that the developments were "determined" by 
technological imperatives. Such considerations are essentially political rather than 
technical, and, as such, they are potentially open to revision and renegotiation. 
Technological determinism as a concept has limited value for exploring the 
relationship of technology and politics. To speak of constraints is one thing; to speak of 
determination is another. Politics has always operated within constraints, physical and 
social. Furthermore, when technological determinism is narrowed down to specific 
cases of technological development, it tends to dissipate as an explanation before more 
defined examples of political decision-making and choice, not necessarily democratic 
but choice nevertheless. The problem is Winner's oscillation and ambiguity in his 
understanding of technology and politics. Moreover, in the politics of technology, as 
Dickson has noted, technological determinism as an explanatory concept can itself 
function politically by obscuring those forces whose interests are being furthered by 
particular technological developments and thereby serve to render democratic politics 
more difficult to achieve. 
Technocracy and "technological politics" 
Winner's answer to the failure of traditional political theory to adequately 
account for the contemporary experience of technology is his theory of technological 
politics. However, his adoption of this theory has a number of problems. First, it is 
unclear whether this is a theory to which he himself subscribes or simply his term for 
the general approach adopted in the literature he has surveyed. While the fact that he 
explicates it in some detail would suggest that it has become his own, there is 
nevertheless some ambiguity here. In the second place, it is surprising in the light of his 
discussion of autonomous technology that he should develop a theory of politics at all. 
The implication of all that he has written is that technology has supplanted politics in 
modem society. Here, however, he constructs a theory which in fact affirms the 
existence of a politics of a particular type, a technological politics. How valuable is this 
theory, then, in enabling us to understand the political role of technology in the modem 
world? 
Winner argues that there are essentially two ways of seeing technology as a 
general dilemma in political life - technocracy, rule by a scientific and technical elite, 
and technological politics. Essentially, they are concerned to address the questions 
respectively "Who governs?" and "What govems?" While Winner rejects technocracy, 
the more traditional theory of the politics of technology, as an adequate explanation of 
the nature of politics in a contemporary technological society, his discussion highlights 
again the ambiguities in his analysis. I will refer briefly to it before discussing the 
theory of technological politics in some detail. 
Technocracy 
Winner describes the traditional technocratic view of society as one in which 
"power is ultimately the power of nature itself, released by the enquiries of science and 
made available by the inventive, organizing capacity of technics. All other sources of 
political power - wealth, public support, personal charisma, social standing, organized 
interest - are weak by comparison. They are anachronisms in a technological age and 
will ultimately decline as scientific technology and the people who most directly control 
its forces become more important to the workings of society 
His assessment of such technocratic claims reveals much about his 
understanding of politics and technology. He comments, "These are, of course, 
basically unpolitical ideas...If the possibility they express is accurate, one could look 
forward to a spectacular supersession of politics (whatever its definition). The power 
described here is the cancellation of all other varieties of power and the cancellation of 
the historical debate about how power exists and how it w o r k s " . F o r Winner, 
technocratic ideas are "basically unpolitical" and should they succeed, it would result in 
the "spectacular supersession of politics (whatever its definition)". It is clear from this 
that even should it happen that rule by technicians should ever eventuate, for Winner 
such an arrangement would not as such be political. It would represent the 
"cancellation" of all things political. Authority and power would be exercised but 
seemingly, not "politically". Thus again it becomes clear that the criteria by which 
Winner assesses the "political" nature of technocracy are the criteria of democracy; 
politics is synonymous with democratic politics. 
At the same time, however, he refers to "all other sources of political power" as 
being weak by comparison with scientific power, the implication being that the power 
of science and technics is a source of political power. Thus, Winner is confused as to 
whether he regards technocracy as a political theory or not. It involves for him the rule 
20IMcL, p. 139. 21 Ibid., pp. 139-40. 
of science and technics, not the rule of politics. It is true that as a theory and as an 
ideology, technocracy may represent the supersession of politics, but the theory itself 
can then be understood as a powerful political ideology in its own right. Politics in this 
case does not cease but takes on a particular form. Winner does not explore this 
dimension of technocratic theory. He confuses the ideology of technocracy with the 
reality of its political claims. Furthemiore, it appears that Winner himself believes that 
science may have a valid claim to political neutrality. He doesn't argue against this, so 
much as rejecting it on the grounds of his commitment to the value of democratic 
politics. This is the source of his ambivalence. 
This can be seen in sharp relief when Winner explores the implications of 
technocracy for liberalism and marxism. His analysis is essentially from the perspective 
of a democratic politics. He rejects a simplistic elite analysis; there is no technocratic 
elite dominating the political process, but "a multiplicity of kinds of persons who hold 
power within the political s y s t e m " . 2 2 However, while he acknowledges the complexity 
of power within the political process, he regards this as relatively unimportant, because 
the growing power of technology within the state places in question all political power. 
However, not only are democratic politics under threat as a result of the growing 
dependence upon expertise, but all political arrangements are altered through the 
demands and constraints of large-scale technological systems. Those who have power 
then have it in name only. His whole argument, then, is weakened by his confusion of 
the political and the democratic. 
Technological Politics 
22 Ibid., p. 150. For example. Winner's critique of Don Price and J.K.Galbraith (cf.pp.151-172) is based on their failure to maintain a strong commitment to democratic principles, a failure which for him represents a diminution of the political. "Neither author does much to lend hope to the political possibilities of democracy or representative government under the new set of circumstances".(p.l71) However, he writes later: "We found that neither of two recent analyses of the matter, Don Price and John Kenneth Galbraith, was able to salvage a distinctive role for political knowledge and political actors in an age of advanced technical means".(p.261 italics added). 
However, for Winner, of more significance than ''Who governs" is ''What 
governs?" and this question is the basis of his theory of technological politics. "Here 
one locates the political essence of technology in its total formative impact on all of 
nature and human culture. Technological politics, in this manner of seeing, 
encompasses the whole of technology's capacity to transform, order, and adapt animate 
and inanimate objects to accord with the purely technical structures and processes ... 
Political reality becomes a set of institutions and practices shaped by the domination of 
technical requirements ...My selection of the term technological politics is meant to 
emphasise ...that the rule of technological circumstances in the modem era does in fact 
supplant other ways of building, maintaining, choosing, acting and enforcing, which 
are commonly considered political".23 
In his elaboration on this concept. Winner acknowledges that his use of the 
word "politics" is "beyond its ordinary context", and that such an approach might be 
better termed "a theory of culture". While it could be argued that he has here moved 
beyond his narrow perspective on politics which centred on liberal democratic 
principles, this would be a mistaken view; for this identification of politics with culture 
maintains his previous emphasis on politics as consensus. Culture is something shared 
and, as such, it transcends the divisions of politics. The issue of the politics of 
technology is thus interpreted as essentially a conflict between technology and culture, 
between the system and "us". As such, this perspective very much maintains his 
commitment to a democratic framework. 
Moreover, his understanding of the means by which technology constrains 
political choice centres almost exclusively on "large-scale technical systems". It is 
interesting that this is not strictly one of the four categories outlined at the beginning of 
his book; it appears to be a combination of "network" and "organization". He 
acknowledges this and argues that "twentieth-century technical devices" are 
characterized by "enormous size, complex interconnection, and systemic 
interdependence. In terms of their own intemal structure, most of them require precise 
23 Ib i i , p.237. 
coordination of the three major elements in our earlier definition. Apparatus ahnost 
always requires refined technique: an elaborate, knowledgeable kind of human practice 
to guarantee its successful working. In the great majority of cases, however, both 
apparatus and technique require the presence of well-developed, rational, social 
organization".24 
However, there are many unexamined implications here, particularly the 
political assumptions in such concepts as "successful working" and "rational 
organization". Despite his explanation, it is still difficult to discern the "technology 
itself in this or to know how it is possible to speak about politics and technology as 
two separate units of analysis when by definition, politics is incorporated in the 
definition of technology. For Winner wants to refer to "purely technical structures" and 
"technical requirements" which constrain and determine choice. But what are these 
structures and requirements? While it may be argued that an apparatus requires a 
particular technique (argued but not necessarily accepted). Winner does not justify how 
an apparatus and technique can be said to require large-scale organization. What are the 
technical imperatives as opposed to political considerations? Did the systems become 
large-scale because of technical demands or for other reasons? A focus on large-scale 
systems as "technology", and culture as "politics" makes such a question almost 
impossible to answer. 
A discussion of large-scale technical systems certainly lends itself more readily 
to a cultural understanding of technical hegemony than does one focussing on apparatus 
or technique. And, of course, this is the point Winner wants to make. Traditional 
explanations of the place of technology in political life centred on the apparatus and 
involved a tool-use conception. As such, technology was seen as neutral and under 
political control. "Seen as a way of ordering hum^ activity, the total order of networks 
is anything but neutral and tool-like. In its centrality to the daily activity and 
consciousness of the "employee', the function-serving human component, the technical 
order is more properly thought of as a way of life. Whatever else it may be, a way of 
24 Ibid., p.200. 
life is certainly not neutrar'.^^ Technology has become "the technical order" and 
politics "a way of life". The problem here is that both the technological and the political 
come to mean everything, and therefore, in practical terms, nothing. It is questionable 
how far political questions about technology can be addressed within such a 
framework. 
Winner argues that it is by a process of "reverse adaptation", that ends are 
transformed and all decisions made in order to maintain the functioning of the means. 
As a result, ends are adapted to the means. His basic hypothesis is "that beyond a 
certain level of technological development, the rule of freely articulated, strongly 
asserted purposes is a luxury that can no longer be permitted".^^ it is the relationship 
between ends and means that Winner sees as central to an understanding of the 
implications of technology for politics. He argues that reverse adaptation "violates the 
models of technical practice we normally employ. To the extent to which we employ 
tool-use and ends-means conceptions, our experience will be out of sync with our 
expectations".27 it is that large-scale systems do not fit in with the traditional 
understanding of the relationship of ends and means, "our" expectations, the models of 
technical practice "we" use". 
A recurring phrase in Winner's analysis is "the traditional understanding" of 
technology and it is on the validity of his interpretation of "the traditional 
understanding" of the politics of technology that his argument very much depends. In 
this and a number of associated issues. Winner demonstrates a degree of naivety and a 
tendency to idealise the past. 
First, what are the sources of this "traditional understanding"? There is an 
inference here that all traditional interpretations are the same. However, he does not 
justify his selection of criteria, but almost takes them as possessing universal 
acceptance. Moreover, he does not examine the ideological power of such "traditional" 
claims but rather takes them as an expression of historical reality. He claims that "in the 
25 Ibid., p.201 26 Ifcid., p.238. 27 Ib i i , P.251. 
traditional interpretation, society has at its disposal a set of technological tools for the 
achievement of consciously selected social ends. Megatechnical systems are seen to be 
responsive and flexible. At the command of society or its political institutions, the 
needed goods and services are produced. Control is one-directional and certain, leading 
from the source of social or political agency to the instrument" Here is the master-slave 
metaphor again but with the master in his(?) rightful place. This may or may not be the 
"traditional interpretation". However, it is open to question how accurate such an 
interpretation is. While this understanding of the ends-means relationship may accord 
with the ideological assumptions of liberal democracy generally, it is questionable how 
far such an understanding has ever accorded with real i ty .^S Even Winner's own 
discussion of the weakness of technocratic elite theory highlighted the multi-
dimensional complexity of political power within the state. This is again a case of 
Winner setting up straw view of democratic theory as political reality. 
Winner's understanding of the history of technology, in particular his 
assumptions about the origin of technical systems, compounds the problems of his 
analysis. "One can assume that each of the technologies in question - systems of 
communication, energy supply, transportation, industrial production - was originally 
founded upon some widely accepted purpose: the accomplishment of a particular goal 
or the continuous supply of a product or s e r v i c e " . B u t can one assume this? It is 
questionable how far the "widely accepted purpose" gave rise to the technologies and 
how far the forms the technologies ultimately took were the result of the need to 
accomplish a particular goal or to supply a service. Recent studies in the history of 
technology question this simplistic interpretation of political choice.^^ A major 
weakness of Winner's analysis is his failure to provide concrete historical examples that 
28 Cf. Schumpeter's discussion in Schumpeter, J.A., Capitalism. Socialism and n^mocracv (Unwin University Press, London 1952), pp.240-243. 29 Winner, Antnnomous Technoloev. p.259. 30 Cf. e.g. Hughes, T., "Edison and Electric Light", MacKenzie D. and Wajcman, j.(edsi Thft Social Shaping of Technoloev (Open University Press, Milton Keynes 1985). 
demonstrate his argument. As has been seen, when he does attempt some historical 
analysis, many of his presuppositions are shown to lack substance. 
Winner also argues that traditional public morality has been undermined through 
the considerable levels of corruption which appear as a by-product of large-scale 
technological systems. "Whether in patently corrupt or more ordinary, day-to-day 
manifestations, the influence of technological politics tends to erode the integrity of 
processes through which modem society charts its course".^! Is this to suggest that 
corruption had not been present in pre-technological society, or that large-scale 
technical systems inherently give rise to corruption? Indeed, in some societies, 
corruption is a significant cultural expression of political life. It is not clear whether 
such corruption is to be understood as a denial of politics or an expression of it. If 
Winner's observation is correct, then, at the very least, it raises questions about his 
claims about the diminishing capacity for human control in technological societies. 
Corruption would not exist if there were no significant centres of control over which 
one might wish to exercise some influence. Moreover, what is to count as corruption 
can be, in itself, a part of the rhetoric of political struggle and thus defined differently 
by different groups. Ellul in fact argues that corruption, rather than being a 
manifestation of the influence of technological systems, is the only remaining means by 
which the increasing technicization of politics can be thwarted.^^ 
For Winner, then, politics as "traditionally understood, is essentially normative 
and political theory prescriptive. It is a question of bearings and limits. Technology, for 
him, has rendered those issues irrelevant. He wants to maintain technological politics 
because he understands that constraints of large-scale technical systems as having 
become prescriptive and thus normative for social life. Choices have been made 
politically, he argues, but the results of those choices now constrain us to such an 
extent that political choice is impossible. It is no longer adequate to think primarily in 
terms of the political control of technology through legislation, but rather recognize that 
31 Ibid., p.260. 32 Ellul, The Technological Societv. p.262. 
technology itself is legislation. To understand technology itself as a political 
phenomenon is to "acknowledge that modern technics, much more than politics as 
conventionally understood, now legislates the conditions of human existence".^^ The 
sovereignty of technology has replaced the sovereignty of politics. One determinism 
has replaced another. Here, Winner has moved from a view of politics as dynamic, to a 
view of politics as equilibrium. Rather than politics being the process by which debates 
about the good life are carried on, politics has been reduced to a technical constitution 
establishing order. 
However, this is not a distinction that Winner is able to maintain. There is a 
tension between politics and technology that his discussion continues to highlight even 
when his theory asserts its disappearance. For example, his categorical assertion of the 
control over politics exercised by technology becomes "The system controls or strongly 
influences the political processes that ostensibly regulate its output and operating 
conditions".^^ (Italics added) There is a considerable difference between control and 
influence, and it is a decisive distinction when one is arguing about the impossibility of 
political autonomy in the face of technological systems. This ambivalence becomes 
even clearer when he writes, "New technologies are institutional structures within an 
evolving constitution that gives shape to a new polity, the technopolis in which we do 
increasingly live. For the most part, this constitution still evolves with little public 
scrutiny or debate. Shielded by the conviction that technology is neutral and tool-like, a 
whole order is built - piecemeal, step by step, with the parts and pieces linked together 
in novel ways - without the slightest public awareness or opportunity to dispute the 
character of the changes underway. It is somnambulism (rather than determinism) that 
characterizes technological p o l i t i c s " . ^ ^ 
Winner here argues on the one hand that modem politics is so constrained by 
technical requirements that political autonomy is no longer a possibility, and on the 
other, that this situation is due to the lack of political scrutiny. This is highlighted by his 
33 Winner, Antnnomous Technologv. pp.323-4. 
34 Ib i i , p.243. 
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reference to somnambulism being a greater problem than determinism. People are not 
so much determined as asleep! This assertion tends to place the issue squarely in the 
area of the awareness and consciousness of the democratic community. As for Ellul, 
changed consciousness is the only hope for radical change. Yet most of Winner's 
analysis has in fact been concerned to demonstrate the impossibility of developing an 
altemative political programme in a world of technological politics. If such an analysis 
is valid, then whether one was somnambulent or not would make little difference. 
Political action would be impossible. Again, there is the confusion between the role of 
technology itself and political attitudes to and public scrutiny of technology. Winner's 
analysis would have far greater value if he were to explore why public scrutiny is not 
operative and, as mentioned earlier, why the ideology of tool-use serves to "shield" 
technological developments. 
Conclusion 
Winner's argument in Autonomous Technoloev» and in particular his theory of 
technological politics, is very problematic indeed for an understanding of the political 
nature of technology. It is certainly difficult to see how his analysis can be said to focus 
on "technology itself, for as has been seen, his discussion centres on large-scale 
technical systems, where it is extremely difficult, using his broad definitions, to 
distinguish the political from the technical. While Winner argues that this is indeed one 
of the features of the technological society, he has guaranteed that conclusion by his 
initial categories of investigation. An analysis of the processes by which technology has 
come to have such a significant ideological role in modem society is not provided. 
Furthermore, the theory of technological politics appears to have little application to the 
smaller-scale categories of "apparatus" or "technique", which also require political 
analysis. In fact, on the few occasions when he does refer to these, the role of politics 
becomes much more defined and significant. 
At the same time, there is a good deal of ambiguity as to how it is possible to 
speak of any sort of "politics" in a world of large-scale systems, even "technological 
politics". Where for Winner's earlier discussion, politics implied a democratic politics 
of participation and consensus, with the assumption that technocratic thinking means 
the domination of non-political ideas, with his theory of technological politics, the 
concept changes to politics as "system maintenance". Even then, however, the power 
of the system is not in the technology nor in the impossibility of political action, but 
rather in the failure of public awareness within the democratic community. While he is 
aware of the interests and power of particular groups within the political community 
who are further empowered by technological development, he doesn't explore the 
means by which that empowering is effected. 
In fact, as he does regularly throughout his book. Winner ultimately modifies 
his claims about the novelty and distinctiveness of his approach. He stresses the 
importance of economics and culture in technical development.^^ He acknowledges 
and accepts the criticisms that "orthodox social scientists" and " Marxist analysts" 
would make of his argument: "The theory of technological politics, as I have presented 
it, does not set out to discredit or eliminate either of these conceptions. Instead it seeks 
to illuminate certain gaps and anomalies they contain. It can be used as a supplement to 
either the pluralist interest model or analyses focussing on class conflict, for what the 
theory seeks to establish is that a significant deflection and restructuring of human 
motives occurs when individuals approach technologies for the solutions of their 
p r o b l e m s . However, this is a long way from his earlier claims about the politics of 
"technology itself and the consciousness-altering capacity of technical rationality 
which renders political activity obsolete. The theory of technological politics becomes 
weakened and merely serves to "illuminate" and "supplement" other models of 
analysis. And yet, at the same time. Winner still wants to talk about the "restructuring 
of human motives" when "individuals approach technologies for the solutions of their 
36 Cf. ibid., p.236. 37 IMi , p.263. 
problems"; on the one hand an admission of the limits of an analysis with its focus on 
technology, while on the other, a sweeping affirmation of the cultural power of 
technology. 
The tension here arises not only from his focus on large-scale systems as 
discussed above, but also from the particular individualist assumptions inherent in his 
model of politics and the broader question of motivation. Individuals do not generally 
"approach technologies for the solutions of their problems" in the unproblematic way 
Winner suggests. Individual motivation and interests can be seen to be very much 
shaped by the particular location within the social structure. Technologies too are 
developed within particular social and political environments and by various significant 
processes introduced into the general life of the community. Brian Wynne claims that 
"political processes and language, including technical analysis, can tacitly guide people 
into seeing the world in certain ways, influencing what is regarded as an accepted 
value, and what is inevitable, possible and desirable, or at least tolerable. Such 
processes are not merely instrumental, in the sense of conveying pre-existent ideas, but 
they create new cognitions and bring concrete values into public existence from the 
inchoate informal substratum: they embody the always unfinished attempt to complete 
the moral individual and social being".^^ The central issue then becomes one of the 
analysis of these processes and in particular the ideologies that are constructed to 
legitimate the various social and political arrangements. 
Winner's suggestions for a "truly political technology" include the development 
of new technological forms allowing for flexibility and non-expert understanding, 
participatory decision-making in the introduction of new technologies, and a renewed 
sense of technology as means. However, these suggestions, as he himself says, "have 
overtones of utopianism and unreality". This is only to be expected in an analysis 
which employs on the one hand a too broad understanding of technology and on the 
other, a too restricted concept of politics. Ironically Winner recognizes these 
38 Wynne, B., Rationalitv and Ritual (British Society for the ffistory of Science, 
Chalfont St. Giles 1982), p. 160. 
weaknesses in his theory: "This state of affairs is not well suited to political theory in 
any traditional sense. The theory of technological politics itself, even when it hones its 
critical edge, usually ends up being litde more than an elaborate description. Somehow 
one has to remember the content of other theories and visions in order to catch a sense 
of its significance at all."^^ There appears, in fact, to be no normative dimension to his 
theory at all; it is purely descriptive. His suggestions for a political technology, for 
example, do not emerge from his theory of technological politics but from a 
commitment to democratic theory. Any critical edge in the analysis of technology then 
must come from other theories. It is ironic to see the contribution Winner's own theory 
makes to the blunting of that critical edge. 
Thus, the value of Winner's focus on "technology itself for an understanding 
of the political significance of technology must be questioned. It is the recognition of 
some of these problems that leads Winner to refine his argument and seek to present it 
with greater force in The Whale and the Reactor. 
39 Winner, Autonomous Technolo^v. p.278. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Langdon Winner TI: The Whale and the Reactor 
Langdon Winner's second book was published in 1986. It covers a wide range 
of issues on technology and politics and attempts, as its subtide suggests, to "search for 
limits in age of high technology". While he continues to explore the broad themes 
established in Autonomous Technology, his analysis here is more refined and 
focussed. He ranges over such subjects as appropriate technology, risk assessment, 
information technology and the language of technological debate. As many of the 
chapters in the book were first written as articles, there is a good deal of diversity, not 
only in style and approach, but also in content and argument. 
However, while Winner here adopts a more micro focus than was evident in 
Autonomous Technologv, his analysis is still strongly influenced by an understanding 
of technology that is macro in perspective. Thus, the insights that he gains from a close 
analysis of the political processes involved in technological development are lost when 
he wants to continue to grant causative power to technologies themselves. This chapter 
will argue that what in fact Winner's analysis highlights is not the political nature of the 
technologies themselves, but very much more the political and ideological nature of the 
discourse which surrounds those technologies and associated technological debates. 
This chapter will focus primarily on Winner's first three chapters, 
"Technologies as Forms of Life", "Do Artifacts Have Politics?", and "Techne and 
Politeia", as they explicitiy have the politics of technology as their tiieme. Reference 
will be made to other chapters as they relate to this central theme. 
Winner begins his preface with a familiar theme: "The map of the world shows 
no country called Technopolis, yet in many ways we are already its citizens. If one 
observes how thoroughly our lives are shaped by interconnected systems of modem 
technology, how strongly we feel their influence, respect their authority, and participate 
in their workings, one begins to understand that, like it or not, we have become 
members of a new order in human history...Observing the structures and processes of 
these vast systems, one begins to comprehend a distinctively modem form of power, 
the foundations of a technopolitan culture". ̂  This opening makes it clear that Winner is 
continuing his project of seeking to provide an understanding of the novel problems 
posed by the all-encompassing world of technical systems. At the same time, it raises 
doubt about whether Winner has progressed in terms of the clarity with which he 
addresses the issue of the political ramifications of technology. 
The last phrase of the quotation captures very well the essence of Winner's 
perspective. Humans have entered a new phase in the history of human culture; they 
have become "members of a new order". Winner indeed uses political terminology -
"power", "citizens", "authority" - yet within a context of technology as culture. So 
Winner continues where he left off, with a significant conceptual confusion in his use 
of the terms "culture", "power" and "politics". While his next chapters do tend to a 
more narrow perspective on technology and politics. Winner never abandons his broad 
understanding of technology as culture, and as a result, his analysis of the political is 
continually rendered problematic. 
"Technologies as Forms of Life" 
Winner's first chapter is very much a rehearsal of his argument in Autonomous 
Technoloev.^ Emphasising the urgent need to develop a critical philosophy of 
technology. Winner continues to argue that the central focus of such an enterprise must 
be "the many ways in which technologies provide structure for human activity".^ 
1 Winner, L., The. Whale and the Reactor (The University of Chicago, Chicago 1986), 
p.ix. 
2 It is a significant that while his argument continues that of Autonomous Technologv. 
it is an important step towards conceptual clarity that Winner refers to "technologies" as 
opposed to "technology", as for example, in "autonomous technology". The plural 
form recognizes the fact of the variety of technologies and thus the requirement of 
possibly different types of analysis. Cf. below, the discussion of "Do Artifacts have 
Pontics?". 
3 ¡ M i , p.6. 
Again, Winner's bete noir is the "deceptively reasonable notion" of technology that 
understands it as a neutral tool, whose moral value is assessed essentially in terms of its 
use. He wants to move beyond an understanding of technology in terms of "cause" and 
"effect". However, here, he promises to provide somewhat of a corrective to the broad, 
impressionistic sweep of his first book by narrowing his focus to "the ways, both 
obvious and subtle, in which everyday life is transformed by the mediating role of 
technical devices".With the emphasis on "technical devices" and the transformation of 
"every day life", there appears to be a solid basis for analysis here that was lacking in 
his earlier work. Attention is to be given not to the fact that technologies are powerful 
agents of transformation, but rather how they come to have the power they do. Such an 
analysis is vital for any real understanding of the political implications of technology. 
However, Winner's analysis does not fulfil this promise. He is extremely vague 
on what it is that is transformed and therefore, what it is that is to be the focus of study. 
In some cases, for example, he refers to the "reconstitution of the conditions of life", 
and, at other times, simply to "human activity". It is important to be clear about exactly 
what it is that he is referring to. One may be quite happy to agree that a technology 
transforms activity in some way, without necessarily accepting that such a 
transformation is one involving "conditions of life". The introduction of a photocopier 
into an office, for example, may alter activity there without necessarily being said to 
"transform the conditions of life". Moreover, while Winner's reference to the mediating 
role of "technical devices" appears to offer a far more precise use of "technology" than 
that of his earlier work, and one providing at least the possibility of some empirical 
investigation, he, however, refers in the same chapter to "devices, techniques and 
systems" as a cluster term for technology, thereby making an adequate analysis very 
difficult for reasons spelt out earlier. Thus, at the end of his discussion, one is no 
clearer as to what is to constitute the focus of an analysis of the "mediating role of 
technical devices". 
4 Ibid., p.9. 
Political choice and "forms of life" 
Winner's adoption of Wittgenstein's concept of "forms of life" to convey his 
understanding of the ways in which technology structures social and political life 
compounds this difficulty. It is interesting that whereas in Autonomous Technology, he 
used a political metaphor (technology as legislation) to express his understanding of the 
contemporary significance of technology, here he uses a more comprehensive 
philosophical formulation. Nevertheless, Winner finds himself confronted by the same 
problems he faced in his first book. At the same time as he wishes to highlight the 
threat to politics posed by technology, his particular description of the nature of 
technology often threatens to eliminate the possibility of politics altogether. 
Such is the case with his use of Wittgenstein's concept of "forms of life". Now 
"forms of life" as generally understood, refer essentially to the given structures of 
social existence which determine how one is enabled to understand meaning.^ There is 
a givenness about such forms that one is unable to break. Now, while Winner admits to 
using the concept "suggestively", there is a contradiction at the very centre of his 
argument, one that featured in Autonomous Technolosv and which appears in most 
critiques of totalitarian technical domination. On the one hand, technology 
"reconstitutes the conditions of human existence" and on the other, members of society 
need to be aware of, and in some way m£ike decisions about, that process of 
reconstitution. Thus, "Individual habits, perceptions, concepts of self, ideas of space 
and time, social relationships, and moral and political boundaries have all been 
powerfully restructured in the course of modem development".^ Yet, "it seems 
characteristic of our culture's involvement with technology that we are seldom inclined 
to examine, discuss, or judge pending innovations with broad, keen awareness of what 
those changes mean".^ 
5 Cf. Bauman, Z., Hermeneutics and Social Science (Hutchinson, London 1978), 
pp.211-216. 6 Winner, The. Whale and the Reactor, p.9. 7 Ibid. 
The essential point about "forms of life", however, is that they are generally 
understood to be so much a part of human consciousness that it is impossible to stand 
outside them and coolly assess them. Forms of life are not something that one can 
choose to accept or reject. The very processes by which one makes "choices" are an 
expression of those very forms of life. This relates to Winner's references to 
somnambulism in his earlier book. In fact, he again claims in this chapter that the 
problem is not determinism so much as somnambulism. However, as I discussed 
previously, it must be one or the other; it cannot be both. It is either a "form of life" or 
not. If it is a form of life, then no alternative response is possible. 
Winner argues that the understanding of technologies as forms of life had its 
roots in Marx's understanding of productive activity as a "mode of life". His discussion 
in this context appears promising with his comment that Marx's interpretation "includes 
a place for a more microscopic treatment of specific technologies in human 
experience".8 However, beyond this. Winner's discussion throws little light on the 
means by which technologies come to occupy this place of central cultural significance. 
What is notable is that his discussion focusses on the role of the productive forces, 
which he understands to mean technologies, in the formulation of human 
consciousness. He does not mention the capitalist framework of power nor the class 
struggle. 
The location of "the political" 
His adoption of the concepts of Wittgenstein and Marx then does not contribute 
greatly to a clearer understanding of the political implications of technology but rather 
serves to obscure the issue. This is reflected in the conclusion Winner reaches, and one 
that in fact features the first specific reference to the political in the chapter where he 
insists "that we pay attention not only to the making of physical instruments and 
processes, although that certainly remains important, but also to the production of 
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psychological, social and political conditions as a part of any significant technical 
change".9 
This statement highlights the difficulty Winner has in being able to identify 
where the political is to be located. Only when that question is answered, however, can 
the political implications of technology begin to be validly explored. Here, Winner in 
fact counterposes "the making of physical instruments and processes" to the 
"production of psychological, social and political conditions" associated with any 
technical change. He wants to conceptually separate the construction of technologies 
from the conditions produced by them. However, if it is not in the construction of these 
instruments and processes that the social and political conditions are produced, then 
where? He needs to explain how the particular political conditions come to be 
associated with the technologies, if not in their construction. The implication here is that 
the political conditions are separate from the technology, yet resulting from it. 
In fact, this approach appears little different from one which he earlier rejected -
a focus on the "effects" of a particular technological development. Winner certainly 
appears less interested in the politics of the construction of technologies than in the 
political effects of those technologies, however these are to be understood. It is 
certainly difficult to see how Winner can maintain that his thesis constitutes an analysis 
focussed on the politics of "technology itself, when here the political is understood to 
be separate from the technical. 
"Forms of life" as ideology 
The ambiguity of Winner's analysis is highlighted when he asks: "Are we going 
to design and build circumstances that enlarge possibilities for growth in human 
freedom, sociability, intelligence, creativity and self-government? Or are we headed in 
an altogether different d i r e c t i o n ? " Here Winner implies that what "we" are designing 
9 I M 4 , p . l 7 . 10 Ibid. 
and building are not "technologies", but "circumstances"! What does this mean? How 
are "technologies" and "circumstances" linked? And of what value is this claim for an 
analysis which takes as its focus technology itself? The central question Winner 
identified at the beginning of his chapter remains unaddressed: how do technologies 
structure and transform human life? It will be difficult to answer while the focus is on 
circumstances rather than the technologies! 
Furthermore, if technologies are "forms of life" structuring our understanding 
of what it means to be human, what is the source and basis of Winner's commitment to 
"growth, human freedom, sociability, intelligence, creativity, and self govemment" and 
how are such non- technological values possibly arrived at when such technological 
"forms of life" dominate consciousness? As was noted earlier, such commitments need 
to be justified, especially in the context of a discussion of the consciousness-creating 
power of technologies as forms of life. 
The weakness of Winner's argument is the adoption of "forms of life" as an 
explanatory philosophical concept, when his stated project is a focus on the specifically 
political nature of technology. This results in his neglecting to focus on what is the 
seemingly obvious, yet unexamined implication of his argument - that particular 
ideological explanations play a central political role in debates about technological 
development . "Forms of life" could just as well be understood to have the same 
function as "ideology". Winner's repeated reference to the "structures", "conditions" 
and "circumstances" of technology can in fact be seen to be a recognition of the means 
by which such "forms of life" associated with technology may be ideologically 
constructed. Winner's ambiguity in wanting to locate the political in the technology, but 
at the same time wanting to acknowledge the role of "forms of life" and circumstances 
in the technological order, could be resolved by a focus on the source and nature of the 
particular ideology involved in debates about technology. 
However, Winner does not pursue this line of analysis. This is ironic because 
his discussion of Wittgenstein does in fact include a discussion of the nature of 
language as social construction.il However, Winner is more concerned with the 
impact of technological forms on our thinking than with the effect of our thinking on 
our technological forms. Winner's failure to explore the nature of ideology in 
technological debates results in his subsuming the political under a general philosophy 
of culture which tends to obscure the political nature of technological change rather than 
open it to investigation. 
"Forms of life" and political change 
However, while Winner's analysis in this chapter continues the broad cultural 
perspective of technology that informed Autonomous Technologv. it is not 
characterized by the same political despair. Even though his argument is at times 
somewhat ambiguous, he does not claim that technologies as forms of life cancel out 
political choice. In fact, he now rejects technological determinism for being "much too 
strong, far too sweeping in its implications to provide an adequate theory. It does little 
justice to the genuine choices that arise, in both principle and practice, in the course of 
technical and social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " . 1 2 A t the same time. Winner has modified his 
model of the rational citizen using the democratic process to make well-defined choices, 
by recognizing the constructedness of much political behaviour. However, as has been 
discussed above, he continues to attribute this process of construction to the technology 
itself, even when his own analysis suggests that it has more to do with particular 
attitudes to and interests in technological development. 
Nevertheless, Winner still wants to hold that the task of reform is a political 
one. "The study of politics offers its own characteristic route into this territory. As the 
political imagination confronts technologies as forms of life, it should be able to say 
something about the choices (implicit or explicit) made in the course of technological 
innovation and the grounds for making those choices wisely". For Winner then, the 
1 1 C f . i b i d . , p . 1 5 . 
1 2 I b i i , p . l O . 
1 3 I b i d . , p . l 8 . 
political task is both descriptive and normative. Political theory should be able to 
provide the basis for "wise" decisions. Choice and control, dimensions of political life 
whose possibility had been questioned in Autonomous Technology, are now 
resurrected as co-workers with political theory in providing for a freer and more 
creative society. For Winner, decisions about technology are to reflect political 
"wisdom". The implication of his argument is that there is the wise choice, the criteria 
of which are "possibilities for growth in human freedom, sociability, intelligence, 
creativity, and self-government". He proposes then a model of politics, which is 
essentially substantive, a politics which will make decisions which conform to a 
particular political perspective. However, as has been noted, he fails to justify this 
commitment and, as will be discussed more fully below, can be said to unwittingly 
promote an anti-politics. 
Nevertheless, it is to this mission of developing wiser political and technical 
choices that Winner directs his attention in his chapter "Do Artifacts have Politics?". 
"Do Artifacts have Politics?" 
As was noted above. Winner's opening chapter does not bring much 
clarification to the concepts of technology and politics. However, very significantiy, he 
does affirm the possibility of politics within the technological order. It is in the 
important second chapter, "Do Artifacts have Politics?" that Winner explicitly addresses 
the relationship between technology and politics. As this chapter represents Winner's 
most developed position on this subject, I will discuss it in some detail. 
Winner's definitions of "politics" and "technology" 
As opposed to his earlier discussion, Winner is concerned to make his use of 
concepts clear: "By the terms ^politics' I mean arrangements of power and authority in 
human associations as well as the activities that take place within those arrangements. 
For my purposes here, the term "technology" is understood to mean all of modem 
practical artifice, but to avoid confusion I prefer to speak of "technologies" plural, 
smaller or larger pieces of hardware of a specific kind".!^ This focus on "technology" 
understood as "hardware" is a much more useful analytical tool than his previous broad 
understanding. However, as will be suggested below, some reference to "technique" 
might also have been valuable. 
Winner's definition of "politics", on the other hand, appears to have been 
broadened and generalized. The term has been largely divested of its normative 
dimension; no longer does it appear to be a synonym for "democracy". Politics is "the 
arrangements of power and authority in human associations". The site of politics then is 
no longer seen to be the state, but any "human association". Winner then incorporates 
these definitions in the central question for a political philosophy of technology: "At 
issue is the claim that the machines, structures and systems of modem material culture 
can be accurately judged not only for their contributions to efficiency and productivity 
and their positive and negative environmental side effects, but also for the ways in 
which they can embody specific forms of power and authority". ̂ ^ 
While technology understood as "machines, stmctures and systems of modem 
material culture" suggests a focus that is daunting in its comprehensiveness, his 
formulation of the central issue emphasises that he is less interested in questions about 
the efficiency or effects of technology, than in the impUcations of the latter for political 
arrangements. It is significant that whereas Dickson understands these aspects to be 
linked. Winner sees them as conceptually separate. 
14 Ibid., p.22. 
15Ibi4, p. 19. 
Technological politics and the social determination of technology 
Winner attempts to provide an analysis of the politics of technology which is 
different from, yet complementary to, what he calls "the social determination of 
technology". ̂ ^ He characterizes this latter approach, which is essentially that adopted 
by Dickson and Braverman, as being concerned to argue that "what matters is not the 
technology itself, but the social or economic systems in which it is imbedded".^^ While 
acknowledging the importance of such a view, he argues that it is inadequate because 
"taken literally, it suggests that technical things do not matter at all". The implication 
of this approach, he suggests, is that there is nothing distinctive about the study of 
technology. Analysts can then "return to their standard models of social power - those 
of interest group politics, bureaucratic politics, Marxist models of class struggle, and 
the like - and have everything they need. The social determination of technology is, in 
this view, essentially no different from the social determination of, say, welfare policy 
or taxation". 
Against this. Winner argues that there are "good reasons to believe that 
technology is politically significant in its own right...".20 Important insights are to be 
gained by a focus on "technology itself. The vehicle for such an analysis is again his 
theory of technological politics. However, in line with his changed perspective on 
technological determinism, this theory has developed from its earlier form in 
Autonomous Technoloev. where it appeared to represent the end of genuine politics, to 
a broader formulation here referred to as "an odd mongrel of notions often crossbred 
16 It is interesting to compare this term with that of the "social shaping of technology" as in MacKenzie, D. and Wajcman, J.(eds.), The Social Shaniny of Technology (Open University Press, Milton Keynes 1985). From his discussion, Wmner appears to exclude much of what supporters of the latter approach would want to understand by "social shaping". It is interesting then that an earlier draft of this chapter appears in MacKenzie and Wajcman. 17 Ib i i , p.20. 18 Ibid., p.21. 19 ¡Md. 20 Ibid. 
with orthodox liberal, conservative and socialist philosophies''.^! He explicitly defines 
as its starting point "a decision to take technical artifacts seriously. Rather than insist 
that we immediately reduce everything to the interplay of social forces, the theory of 
technological politics suggests that we pay attention to the characteristics of technical 
objects and the meaning of those characteristics...this approach identifies certain 
technologies as political phenomena in their own right" .22 
It is important to grasp Winner's distinction here. He is arguing that the political 
significance of technology cannot be understood simply in terms of the "social shaping" 
model; that it is qualitatively different from the social determination of other aspects of 
political life such as taxation. While it is unfortunate that he should have chosen as a 
comparative example what is essentially a state responsibility, he nevertheless makes 
clear the distinctiveness he claims for the political significance of technology. The 
focus of analysis is to be tiie characteristics of technical objects and their" meaning", 
rather than "immediately" reducing everything to the "interplay of social forces". 
However, there are a number of problems with this approach. 
First, as he did in his previous chapter. Winner assumes here that the 
characteristics of the technology can be examined prior to, and therefore separately 
from, a study of the associated interplay of social forces. The use of "immediately" 
suggests that the analysis will have as its ultimate focus tiiose social forces, but that 
there will be aspects in which tiie technology itself can be said to have politics prior to 
and distinct from such a focus. In such a way, technical phenomena will be seen to be 
political "in tiieir own right". However, if Winner's methodology is followed and the 
analysis is not "immediately" reduced to the social forces involved, what then is the 
object of inquiry? One is left with a set of artifacts. But what then are the questions one 
is to ask in order to gain an understanding of the political nature of these artifacts? 
The very term "political" involves questions of power and autiiority; tiiese by 
their very nature are "social forces". Therefore, to even begin a political analysis of a 
22Ibiipp.21-2. 
particular technology means bringing a particular theoretical understanding of the nature 
of power and authority, that is, of social forces, to the very questions that one asks. It 
can only be within such a framework that an inquiry can be undertaken. Therefore to 
argue that the analyses can be separated is fallacious and raises immediate problems for 
an understanding of what might be meant by artifacts being political "in their own 
right". Moreover, Winner appears to imply that, irrespective of what this might mean, 
the ultimate focus will always be the social forces involved. If this is so, it raises 
doubts as to how central a focus on technology itself really is to an adequate analysis of 
the politics of technology. 
There are also problems with an analysis concemed with the "meaning" of a 
particular artifact. Not only is the determination of what is to constitute "meaning" a 
difficulty, but so also is the question of the determination of meaning for whom? The 
fact that the social construction of meaning might itself be a political issue appears not 
to be considered. 
In his study of symbolic politics, Murray Edelman suggests that "(m)eaning and 
response are not the same for everyone, but a function of group interest or mutual role-
t a k i n g " . 2 3 Meaning is understood to be a result of the political process, not 
autonomous of or prior to it. The implication of Winner's argument, however, is that 
there is an essential meaning which is able to be "discovered", a meaning that 
transcends existing inequalities in power or differences of interest. Such an 
understanding severely limits Winner's investigation. Again he fails to address issue of 
the ideological nature of technological debate. In fact, "meaning" in Winner's use of 
the term appears to relate primarily to the nature of the consequences of particular 
technical decisions. This is somewhat of a problem for this "effects" analysis is the 
very approach he has rejected as being too simplistic. 
23 Edelman,M., The Svmbolic Uses of Politics (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1964), p.l l5. Also cf. Shapiro, M., Language and Political Understanding (Yale University Press, New Haven 1981). 
There are two broad frameworks in which Winner believes artifacts might be 
said to have politics. "First are instances in which the invention, design or arrangement 
of a specific technical device or system becomes a way of settling an issue in the affairs 
of a particular community...Second are cases of what can be called 'inherently political 
technologies', man-made systems that appear to require or to be strongly compatible 
with particular kinds of political relationships".24 j y^m consider Winner's 
discussion of each category in turn before evaluating how far he succeeds in 
demonstrating that artifacts do indeed have politics. 
Politically flexible technologies 
Winner bases his discussion of the first of these categories on three case studies 
- the overpasses of Robert Moses, the moulding machines of Cyrus McCormick and 
the tomato harvester of southern California. While each of these examples highlights 
different aspects of the the politics of the artifact, Winner links the first two as being 
essentially more "conspiratorial" in nature than the third and their politics therefore 
more easily visible. I will follow him in treating the first two together before looking at 
the third. 
Robert Moses controlled New York's public works programme between the 
1920's and 1970's. Winner maintains that Moses sought to exclude poor people and 
blacks from gaining access to his public parks by ensuring the overpasses were built in 
such a way as to prevent public buses from passing beneath them. "They were 
deliberately designed and built that way by someone who wanted to achieve a particular 
social e f f e c t " . 2 5 As a result, specific political relationships have become permanently 
embodied in the technical environment of the everyday world of New Yorkers. Moses' 
personal power has gone but his politics live on through the shape of the public life he 
created through his artifacts. 
24 Winner, The. Whale and the Reactor, p.22. 25 I b i i , p.23. 
In the case of the McCormick reaping manufacturing plant, less efficient and 
more expensive moulding machines, which could be worked by unskilled labour, were 
introduced into the firm in order to destroy the power of skilled workers whose union 
was challenging management control. Thus, Winner argues, "if we suppose that new 
technologies are introduced to achieve increased efficiency, the history of technology 
shows that we will be sometimes disappointed".^^ 
For Winner, these two examples clearly demonstrate the means by which 
certain individuals or groups used artifacts for particular political purposes. His use of 
actual historical examples of technological change is to be welcomed. However, does 
he succeed in demonstrating that these artifacts are political phenomena "in their own 
right"? It is important to notice here that Winner argues that he is not simply talking 
about the ways in which technologies "enhance the power, authority and privilege of 
some over others". Such is too narrow an understanding of the politics of technology. 
His argument is more sophisticated than that. The relevant passage needs to be quoted 
at length. 
"In our accustomed way of thinking technologies are seen as neutral tools that 
can be used well or poorly, for good, evil, or something in between. But we usually do 
not stop to inquire whether a given device might have been designed and built in such a 
way that it produces a set of consequences logically and temporally prior to any of its 
professed uses... If our moral and political language for evaluating technology includes 
only categories having to do with tools and uses, if it does not include attention to the 
meaning of the designs and arrangements of our artifacts, then we will be blinded to 
much that is intellectually and practically c r u c i a l " . 2 7 
This is a key passage for an understanding of Winner's argument. He argues 
that the politics of the artifact does not simply consist in the fact that it may enhance the 
power of some over others. The politics appears in the fact that some technologies may 
have been constructed in such a way as to produce a set of particular political 
26 Ibid., p.24. 27 Ibid., p.25. 
consequences and that such consequences, being built into the artifact, actually precede 
its "professed" or obvious uses. However, it is not clear how such a political focus 
differs in any real sense from a concern with the enhancement of the power of "some 
over others", especially when his definition of "politics" is "arrangements of power and 
authority in human associations". 
Winner's understanding of "artifact" and "use" 
The confusion in his analysis arises from the ambiguity in his use of "artifact" 
and "use". He argues that the view that technology is neutral and therefore to be 
evaluated in terms of its use is inadequate. And yet, he can speak about particular 
consequences being guaranteed by the design of the artifact, the suggestion being that 
the artifact could have been built differently. In fact, his description of this category of 
artifact speaks of the invention, design or arrangement of a technology becoming "a 
way of settling an issue", a political intention preceding the production of a particular 
artifact. 
There are two understandings of artifact here: one, which refers to the 
completed technology, and a second which appears to refer more accurately to 
"technique" or concept. How "use" will be understood will depend on which 
understanding of artifact is adopted. If the first, then "use" will be determined by the 
completed artifact itself and will apply particularly to the use by the "consumer" of the 
finished product. If the second, the "use" will refer to the ways in which the concept or 
design is realised in the artifact and will apply particularly to the motives of the 
developer of that artifact. In this latter case, it could be argued, and in fact Winner 
implies as much in his discussion, that the technique or concept may in fact be 
understood as being neutral, but "used" for good or evil ends (whatever one's 
particular political perspective). To imply that a technology might be developed 
differently is not too far from suggesting it could be "used" differently. His claim, then, 
that artifacts have politics in a way different from that suggested by the arguments of 
the scxiial determination theorists would seem to be based on the first understanding of 
artifact, whereas their focus is primarily on the second understanding. This may explain 
why Winner insists on referring to artifacts "having politics" rather than "being 
political". 
Winner's two examples highlight this ambiguity about "use" and "artifact". The 
political significance of the bridges and the moulding machines lay in their "use", which 
can be seen as the effects either of their design, as in the case of the bridges, or of their 
implementation, as with the moulding machines. These particular consequences, which 
are political, are understood to be intended. That is, it can be argued that these 
consequences issue from the ways in which the particular technologies are employed or 
"used", the very interpretation Winner is seeking to challenge. Thus, the bridges' 
professed use was to "carry automobiles from one point to another", the mouldings "to 
make metal castings". However, as Winner's reference to "professed uses" suggests, 
these artifacts could be said to have other "uses", those meeting the interests of those 
who control such technologies in the first place. Thus, it is possible to see technologies 
as neutral techniques or "tools" used for good or evil. 
In the case of the McCormick moulding machines, for example, the issue is 
clear. There was a technical process of some potential, predating the conflict, which 
was introduced into the plant primarily as a means of solving an industrial dispute. The 
politics in this example, however, is to be located not in the machinery itself, but in the 
decision and power of management to develop and introduce the new technology in 
order to resolve the issue to their advantage. There was nothing in the moulding 
machines themselves that guaranteed a particular outcome; it was in the particular 
application of that technology by management. 
In the Moses example, however, Winner argues that the design of the bridges 
themselves did guarantee a particular outcome. The important question is where is the 
artifact to be located here? Is it in the technology of a bridge, or of Moses' particular 
bridges. While public transport and their "consumers" could not use Moses' bridges 
because of their particular design, it is obvious that Moses could have used the 
technology of "the bridge" in other ways. Neither the height of the bridges nor the 
introduction of the moulding machines can be said to have been detemiined by technical 
considerations; they were a result of the social and political context in which those 
technologies were applied. Thus they could have been used differently or, in the case of 
the moulding machines, not at all. There is a real sense, then, in which bridges and 
moulding machines are neutral artifacts, which, in the examples given, were used for 
particular political purposes.28 it is difficult to see then that arguing that these 
technologies "have politics" is to be saying anything more than that through them, those 
in power consolidate (enhance) thek power and authority; but then that can be said of 
any political decision, not simply those involving the technical. 
Politics as prior to and distinct from the artifact 
In both examples, then, power cannot be seen to be vested in the particular 
artifact except as one aspect of a broader framework of power relations. The power, 
authority and privilege of Robert Moses enabled him to "use" the bridges in such a 
way; the powerlessness of the marginalised led to them being so constrained by those 
bridges. In no way can it be argued that it was the bridges themselves that rendered the 
marginalised powerless. In fact that tautological construction, "the powerless 
marginalised", highlights the irony of the claim that artifacts have politics. The 
tautology consists in the argument that blacks and the poor were prevented from 
visiting Jones beach because the buses could not pass under the bridges; whereas, in 
truth, they were prevented by the very social structure which distributes power in such 
28 Winner implicitly acknowledges these two understandings of artifacts, albeit with 
decisions being seen to be made democratically, when he writes that "within a given 
category of technological change, there are roughly speaking, two kinds of choices that 
can affect the relative distribution of power, authority and privilege in a community". 
These are a yes/no decision where "the fundamental choice...is whether or not the thing 
is going to join society as a piece of operating equipment"; and the second "has to do 
with specific features in the design or arrangements of a technical system after the 
decision to go ahead with it has already been made".(p.27) The significance of the 
phrase "affect the relative distribution of power, authority and privilege" is noted in the 
following discussion. 
a way that Robert Moses had such power and they very litde. In Winner's argument, 
however, the political issue comes to be centred in the artifact and reduced to the 
question of access to public parks. The real political issue of the nature of the 
inequalities in wealth and power which allowed such decisions to be made in the first 
place is ignored. 
An important associated issue which Winner raises but does not explore is what 
could be called "the politics of the non-artifact". He notes that "Moses made doubly 
sure of this result by vetoing a proposed extension of the Long Island Railroad to Jones 
B e a c h " . I n terms of Winner's thesis, it could be asked "Do non-artifacts have 
politics?" The absence of an artifact may be as politically significant as its presence. So, 
the lack of a railroad can be seen to be as significant as the height of the bridges. 
However, there is no rail-road to "have politics". So if one focussed only on existing 
artifacts, one is likely to miss the broader political realities involved. What is common 
to the artifact and non-artifact is the politics involved in the decision-making process 
that allowed the particular result. The real political significance then is not the artifacts 
themselves but in the intended consequences of their development.. 
Winner in fact acknowledges these points: "In all the cases cited above the 
technologies are relatively flexible in design and arrangements are variable in their 
effects. Although one can recognize a particular result produced in a particular setting, 
one can also easily imagine how a roughly similar device or system might have been 
built or situated with very much different political consequences''.^^ The emphasis here 
is on the flexibility of the "device" which could have had different consequences. Thus 
after all his discussion about the problems of "our accustomed way of thinking", he 
comes back to a view of technology as "flexible device", and of "use" and "effects" as 
determining the politics of a particular artifact. 
Thus it is important that one be clear about which understanding of "use" and 
"artifact" is being employed, for if one concentrates solely on the "use" by the 
29 Ibid., p.23. 
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consumer, then it is possible to see the constraints on possible action being embodied 
essentially in the completed technology itself and therefore to argue that it is the artifacts 
that have politics. But if the focus is on the use of a particular technique by the 
designers or owners of production, then the constraints are essentially to be located 
within the decisions of those groups. Attention then will be given to those groups and 
the nature of their power rather than to the technology itself. As Winner's focus is 
invariably on the "receivers" of the completed artifact and its "meaning" for them, he 
fails to adequately address the issue of the power of the producers and their particular 
interests. 
Technology and Ideology 
However, Winner wants to address a more complex issue in his analysis - the 
fact that political decisions can be disguised as the "merely technical". This seems to be 
at the basis of his argument that analysis of technology should therefore involve a 
process of deconstruction. He comments, for example, that "some of the most 
interesting research on technology and politics at present focuses upon the attempt to 
demonstrate in a detailed, concrete fashion how seemingly innocuous design features in 
mass transit systems, water projects, industrial machinery, and other technologies 
actually mask social choices of profound significance".^! His use of the terms 
"seemingly innocuous" and "mask" highlights what is essentially a claim about the 
ideological role of science and technology. Winner implicitiy recognized this in his 
earlier reference to the "professed uses" of individual artifacts but did not elaborate. The 
important question then becomes which uses of the particular technologies are 
"professed", which are hidden and why and how each comes to be so. The implication 
of Winner's argument is that the political comes to be hidden in decisions which are 
claimed to be technical, and therefore neutral. The neutrality of the technique becomes 
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claimed for the completed artifact and technocratic ideology serves to legitimate 
particular political decisions. 
Although this argument has greater force than his thesis that artifacts themselves 
have politics. Winner continues to fail to pursue the issue of the ideological 
construction of technology. He continues instead to locate the politics in the artifacts 
themselves rather than in the discourse about artifacts, and about science and 
technology generally. He is right to examine the nature of political decision-making 
obscured behind technical demands; but his desire to focus on the artifact means that he 
ignores the significance of the defining power of discourse and the processes by which 
that is realised. As a result, his view of what separates the technical from the political is 
problematic. In fact, as I have discussed previously, contrary to his own claims. 
Winner's understanding of the political is linked very much to the nature of the 
consequences of particular decisions. He argues, for example, that "(h)istories of 
architecture, city planning and public works contain many examples of physical 
arrangements with explicit or implicit political p u r p o s e s a n d he mentions here the 
boulevardes of Paris, built wide to limit the possibilities of street fighting. 
Technology as "conspiracy" 
However, the assumption implicit in Winner's discussion is that there can be 
artifacts without political purposes - that certain motivations in technical construction 
are in a sense legitimate while others are not. Thus, Winner appears to be arguing that 
Moses was acting politically when he made certain decisions limiting the height of 
bridges, where had he made decisions allowing the buses to pass under, it would not 
have been political in quite the same way. Had the railroad been extended to Jones 
Beach, that would not so much have been political, as the "correct" decision. It seems 
fair to say that Winner would also hold that a decision to develop a moulding machine 
which incorporated skill would not be seen to be political in the same way either. The 
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artifact would not be said then to have politics; it would have simply been a machine 
built to do the job more "efficiently". 
However, in each of these cases, his definition of politics would have still 
applied - "arrangements of power and authority in human associations". Yet Winner 
appears to understand artifacts to possess politics primarily when the rights of blacks, 
workers,the poor - in fact, citizens generally - are threatened. He doesn't appear to 
recognize that power and authority are involved in technical decisions which have no 
obvious threats to democratic rights and freedoms. He seems to believe that there are 
two types of decisions: "legitimate" technical decisions, and "distorted" decisions made 
"politically". However, all decisions can be understood as being constituted by the 
interplay of the forces of power and authority. All debates about the "technical" are 
infused with political assumptions about such things as the understanding of 
"efficiency", the nature of energy requirements, and the nature and value of work. 
Unless this is recognized, the study of technological developments will remain 
"problem-centred"; the weakness of such an approach is that even the very definition of 
what constitutes a "problem" is a political issue in its own right. 
Winner thus ironically ends up arbitrarily separating the political and technical, 
rather than combining them as his analysis implies. Furthermore, when no group can 
be identified as responsible for the threat to democratic freedoms posed by a particular 
technology, that is, where there is no identifiable conspiracy. Winner proceeds to locate 
the politics in the technology itself. However, this results from his failure to recognize 
that power is exercised in and through the very ideological constitution of a society. 
Within such a framework, technological developments will be seen to be an expression 
of that constitution rather than embodying power in their own right. 
"Non-conspiratorial" technology 
That such is the case becomes clear when Winner briefly touches on the 
problems of the handicapped.To demonstrate that "to recognize the political dimensions 
in the shapes of technology does not require that we look for conscious conspiracies or 
malicious i n t e n t i o n s " , 3 3 he cites the situation of the handicapped, who were effectively 
excluded from involvement in American public life due to the discriminatory technical 
arrangements that structure social and political life. 
However, as I have said, to speak of power being exercised, whether in ways 
openly discriminatory or not, is not necessarily to speak of conspiracy or malicious 
intent. It is simply to acknowledge the reality of the inequality of power in social and 
political life. In the case of the handicapped, the relatively powerful (in this case, the 
non-handicapped) were able to ensure that technologies were used in their interests. As 
Murray Edelman writes, "(C)onspiracies and scheming are not nearly as useful in 
maintaining inequalities as the more pervasive actions that flow from the logic of the 
social situations in which people find themselves. Elites take advantage of the resources 
available to them, and most support the institutions that allocate resources unequally 
because their situations make those courses of action look rational".^^ 
Thus, it was not until the handicapped movement became more visible and 
militant that technologies were developed in their interests as well. But the political 
change could not be said to have been centred, nor embodied, in changed technology, 
but in the mobilisation of social and political forces which were then able to redefine 
what was to constitute the "rational course of action" and effect the necessary technical 
changes. The technology in no way constrained political action. The issue was one of 
the relativity of access to power rather than one of the politics of the artifact; the result 
was essentially a "redesign", a different and non-discriminatory use of the artifact; the 
artifact used in a different way. 
Winner acknowledges the political and social inequality involved but continues 
to locate it in the technology: "There are instances in which the very process of technical 
development is so thoroughly biased in a particular direction that it regularly produces 
results heralded as wonderful breakthroughs by some interests and crushing setbacks 
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by others...one must say that the technological deck has been stacked in advance to 
favour certain social interests and that some people were bound to receive a better hand 
than others".35 Winner does not explore why it is that the "technological" deck has 
been stacked in favour of certain social interests as against others. Surely the 
technological deck is a reflection of the political deck, not a result of the nature of the 
particular technologies themselves. The ways these technologies are used is an outcome 
of the particular power arrangements within society. 
Technology and corporate capitalism 
These issues become clearer in Winner's third example - that of the tomato 
harvester. As has been noted, this example takes a slightly different perspective, one 
that Winner is keen to see as less conspiratorial or malicious than the first two and yet 
equally political. He outlines the changes accompanying the introduction of mechanical 
harvesting of tomatoes in Califomia in the late 1960's. These include the development 
of a sturdier breed of tomato to cope with the rougher mechanical process, the 
increasing concentration of tomato growing in fewer hands and the resulting loss of 
jobs, and the growth in productivity and profits. The harvester, he writes, was "the 
occasion for a thorough reshaping of social relationships involved in tomato production 
in rural Califomia".^^ How valid then is it to claim that this artifact has politics? 
Winner seeks to argue that these developments were in no sense the result of a 
plot, as the previous two examples could be said to have been. In fact, a number of 
scholars have exonerated the original developers of the machine and the hard tomato 
"from any desire to facilitate economic concentration in that industry". As discussed 
above, however, it is by no means the case that the exercise of power need be malicious 
or conspiratorial; in fact, it could be argued that the greater the power, the less the need 
for "conspiracy". That means that the pursuit of economic interests need not be seen as 
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part of a plot but as fundamental to the nature of capitalist society. Winner in fact 
recognises the complexity involved. "What we see here ... is an ongoing social process 
in which scientific knowledge, technological invention and corporate profit reinforce 
each other in deeply entrenched patterns, patterns that bear the unmistakable stamp of 
political and economic power".^^ 
While he notes the particularly close ties between large corporations and 
universities, Winner fails to explore its significance or to draw out the implications for 
such interpretations as the "no plot" thesis. The idea of "pure researchers" in 
universities "developing" and "breeding" particular scientific techniques, for whose 
applications they are not responsible, is no longer tenable. Targetted funding directs 
research, "discoveries" become patented and knowledge comes to be used primarily in 
the interests of large corporate enterprises.^^ In this example. Winner in fact fails to 
examine and explain the processes by which the harvester moved from its development 
in the university to its application to the fields of rural Califomia. In focussing on the 
machine, he obscures the political realities that gave rise to its development in the first 
place and which led to its being applied in the ways it was. 
Winner nevertheless argues that "the harvester is not merely the symbol of a 
social order that rewards some while punishing others; it is in a true sense an 
embodiment of that o r d e r " . 3 9 But how does the harvester embody that order? By 
describing first its seemingly unproblematical development in the university and then its 
consequences for the farmers of southern Califomia, Winner conveys the impression 
that the politics, the constraints, are in the artifact itself. However, a discussion of the 
forces of production behind the development and the processes by which it was decided 
how, when and where the harvester was to be introduced, would have highlighted the 
inherent flexibility of the technology, which was noted above, and focussed on the 
exercise of power which produced the final product and its associated results. Winner 
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acknowledges this: "Once the mechanical tomato harvester had been developed in its 
basic form, a design alteration of critical social significance - the addition of electronic 
sorters, for example - changed the character of the machine's effects upon the balance 
of wealth and power in California agriculture".40 But he does not explain why this 
alteration was made. 
More importantly, the conceptual problem, discussed above, of what is meant 
when one refers to the artifact "tomato harvester" needs to be addressed. There was a 
tomato harvester, and then a tomato harvester with electronic sorters. Winner appears to 
be arguing that the early tomato harvester had less "impact" (was less political?) than 
the later model. Is the political nature of the artifact then simply a matter of its effects? If 
so, the effects of which artifact - the early model or the later one? In a passage noted 
above. Winner in fact comments that "one can easily imagine how a roughly similar 
device or system might have been built or situated with very much different political 
consequences." Again, it is the political consequences that are at issue here; how the 
artifact is "used". Yet in fact Winner interestingly avoids attributing these 
consequences directiy to the artifact itself. The artifact was simply the "occasion" for 
the changes, not the "cause". Similar to his reference to "circumstances" above, such a 
vague term makes it very difficult to determine in what ways the artifact itself can be 
said to "have politics". 
Two models of political analysis 
As he tended to do in Autonomous Technolosv, Winner confuses two models 
of political analysis in these three examples. In his discussion of Moses and 
McCormick, he centres his attention on the politics of technological construction with 
the associated issues of motivation, interests and intended results. In the tomato reaper 
example, he ignores the question of motivation in construction and focusses instead on 
the politics of results, the political implications of the effects of a particular technology. 
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The claim that the first model represents a more conspiratorial model of politics than the 
second is far too simplistic. At the very least, the difference results from Winner's 
methodology rather than from any intrinsic differences. For Dickson and Braverman, 
indeed, these three examples would be evidence of the oppressive nature of capitalism. 
For Winner, however, the capitalist framework does not appear to be an issue. 
Moreover, only the McCormick example is true to Winner's initial claim that the 
development of the artifact was political in the sense of "settling an issue in the affairs 
of a particular community". It is certainly difficult to know how the design of Moses 
bridges can be said to have "setd(ed) an issue" in the community. It was in fact the very 
"setdedness" of the power arrangements that allowed this decision in the first place. 
The tomato harvester, in Winner's own argument, can be seen in fact to have unsettled 
affairs in the tomato-growing community of southern California. He does not mention 
what particular issue was settled by the introduction of the harvester. While the 
McCormick example does fulfil this criterion, however, it is in some senses an 
unfortunate choice for such an analysis because it took place in the late nineteenth 
century when union power was just emerging. To have relevance to the contemporary 
political experience of technology, a more current example would have been more 
relevant. Yet, as will be discussed below, political institutions of anysort do not play a 
leading role in any area of Winner's analysis. 
His discussion of the politics of artifacts concludes with Winner retuming to the 
themes of "forms of life" and the necessity for human choice. "Consciously or 
unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies choose structures for 
technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, travel, 
consume, and so forth over a very long time.'"^! Yet again the slippage in his 
argument becomes apparent. The discussion has been about artifacts yet he wants to 
conclude that "societies choose structures for technologies". How does choosing 
"structures for technologies" differ then from choosing artifacts? He cannot resist 
retuming to technologies as forms of life. However, his use of "influence" implies a far 
4 1 I M i 
weaker claim than that of "structure" or "determine". Clearly artifacts influence human 
events; how far they "determine" human experience is a different, and more important, 
question. As has been noted. Winner oscillates between these two claims. 
Moreover, what is meant by "societies choose"? The examples which Winner 
has just finished discussing are clear evidence of the fact that "societies" do not choose 
in any meaningful sense. He acknowledges that such an understanding masks the 
complexity of power involved: "In the processes by which structuring decisions are 
made, different people are situated differently and possess unequal degrees of power as 
well as unequal levels of awareness".^^ This is a more fitting conclusion to his 
discussion. However, again, the issue of the ideological nature of the debate is raised 
and then dropped. He again fails to address the question as to why there are unequal 
levels of awareness. Certainly, the suggestion that there is a technological form of life 
that structures responses is shown to be fallacious when some groups have heightened 
awareness about technical realities and others do not. The issue is not one of 
consciousness itself, but the very power relations that result in the consciousness of 
some being so diminished that they may be unaware of the issues and which render 
them powerless to act even if they were. 
Inherently political technologies 
It is difficult then to see how the technologies discussed by Winner could 
qualify as political phenomena "in their own right". Rather, they seem to fall more 
appropriately into the category of the "social determination of technology" where the 
politics is understood to be located in the framework of decisions about technological 
developments rather than in the artifacts themselves. It would appear that only the 
second category, then, that of "inherentiy political technologies", could really do justice 
to Winner's claim that "technology itself has politics. This category suggests "that 
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some technologies are by their very nature political in a specific way. According to this 
view, the adoption of a given technical system unavoidably brings with it conditions for 
human relationships that have a distinctive political cast - for example, centralized or 
decentralized, egalitarian or inegalitarian, repressive or l i b e r a t i n g " . 4 3 
Winner's discussion of inherendy political technologies begins with an oudine 
of Engels's argument that authority is necessary for the successful operation of such 
technical systems as spinning mills, railways and ships at sea. These technologies 
cannot be run democratically because "by their very nature", they need authoritarian 
control. It is not a question of social organization, but technical imperatives. If Engels's 
observations are correct, then "one would expect that as a society adopted increasingly 
complicated technical systems as its material basis, the prospects for authoritarian ways 
of life would be gready e n h a n c e d " . 4 4 Winner notes however, that Engels was not the 
first to make this claim. "Attempts to justify strong authority on the basis of supposedly 
necessary conditions of technical practice have an ancient h i s t o r y " . 4 5 with these 
references to "justify" and "supposedly necessary conditions", there is already a 
question as to whether Winner's discussion will really be focussing on the technologies 
themselves or rather on claims about the technologies. 
Two versions of technical constraints and political choice 
Winner argues that there are two versions of this theme, one which claims that 
the adoption of a particular technical system "actually requires" a particular social 
arrangement, and a second "somewhat weaker" version which argues that a certain 
technology is "strongly compatible with, but does not strictly require" particular 
political and social arrangements. As an example of the first version. Winner cites 
arguments over nuclear power plants, and of the second, claims about solar energy. 
Winner argues that the political has very much more to do with the wider implications 
4 3 I b i i 
4 5 I b i i 
of the authority structures which these technologies appear to require than the possible 
environmental or health risks associated with them. "The issue has to do with ways in 
which choices about technology have important consequences for the form and quality 
of human associations" ^^ 
Winner also makes a distinction between what he calls the "inner" and "outer" 
conditions associated with technologies, and their implications for politics. Here, there 
is a qualitatively different understanding of the "political" than in his earlier discussion. 
He wishes to make a distinction between the "internal" forms of power and authority 
associated with a technology within an organization and the "external" implications of 
those forms for the broader political context of the state. 
There is, then, a "public" politics and a "private" politics. He argues, for 
example, that it is important to analyse technologies in terms of not only political 
democracy but also industrial democracy and the relationship between them. He claims 
that "One attempt to salvage the autonomy of politics from the bind of practical 
necessity involves the notion that the conditions of human association found in the 
intemal workings of technological systems can easily be separated from the polity as a 
whole".47 However, he argues that to stress political democracy while at the same time 
allowing that technologies require authoritarian forms of organization is to seriously 
throw into question the wider commitment to democratic principles. While this is a 
valid observation. Winner does not explore the nature of the relationship between this 
"public" and "private" politics. It is important that he do so, for each understanding of 
politics may in fact require a different form of analysis. It is one thing to suggest that a 
system is political because it is compatible with a particular form of work organization; 
and quite another to suggest that it has implications for the state as a whole. The 
linkages must be described and justified.'^^ 
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As a prime example of inherently political technologies, Winner gives the 
example of the atom bomb and its particular constraints. He then moves on to an 
examination of the hypothesis that large-scale technical systems of production, 
transportation and communication, for example, railways and oil refineries, in fact 
require a particular social form. Winner suggests that it is possible that "decentralized, 
democratic worker self-management could prove capable of administering factories, 
refineries, communication systems and railroads as well as or better than the 
organizations (this hypothesis) describes".^^ However, he refuses to make any 
judgements about this. What he wants to affirm is that large-scale technical systems are 
"highly compatible with centralized, hierarchical managerial control", and yet, "the 
interesting question is whether or not this pattern is in any sense a requirement of such 
systems". 
There is a continuing tension in Winner's work which is evident here and that is 
the problem of his being able to raise questions about the threats to the democratic 
control of technological development, while at the same time avoiding making such 
control a practical impossibility. So, it is not surprising that he refuses to make a 
judgement about whether technical systems require a particular political arrangement. 
To have answered in the affirmative would have been to eliminate the possibility of 
political choice. He is therefore content to simply raise the question. 
It is important to note that in his discussion of inherentiy political technologies. 
Winner focusses on the technologies in their completed form. He does not apply the 
same type of analysis to their development as he did, for example, to the McCormick 
moulding machines. To examine the political and social context of the development of 
the particular technology may have illustrated an unacknowledged flexibility in its 
shaping. As it is, the politics with which Winner is more concerned here is that related 
to the political circumstances accompanying the technology. 
49 Ibid., p.35. 
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Technology and political discourse 
Winner's discussion of inherently political technologies is characterized by the 
same tendency to focus not on the technical system itself but rather on the discourse of 
technological debate. He continues to discuss claims about technology, rather than 
technology itself. He refers, for example, to the fact that in such debates "the moral 
claims of practical necessity" have greater weight than "moral claims of other sorts".51 
However, he fails to elaborate on his understanding of the morality of practical 
necessity. In what way is necessity moral? At the very least, morality is usually 
understood to involve some element of choice; however, by definition, necessity does 
not allow choice. Here Winner appears to accept the very ideological assumptions 
which undergird claims that some technologies require authoritarian forms of control. 
That Winner has adopted many technocratic assumptions is evident when he 
goes on to argue that "it is characteristic of societies based on large, complex 
technological systems, however, that moral reasons other than those of practical 
necessity appear increasingly obsolete, "idealistic", and irrelevant. Whatever claims one 
may wish to make on behalf of liberty, justice or equality can be immediately 
neutralized with arguments to the effect 'Fine, but that's no way to run a railroad' (or 
steel mill, or airline, or communication system, and so o n ) " . H e r e Winner falls into 
the trap of referring to "societies based on large, complex technological systems" and in 
so doing, defines societies precisely in terms of their technologies rather than by their 
politics or values. He employs the very discursive assumptions that he seeks to 
criticize. To define the society in such a way is to concede the dominance of the very 
conceptual framework that he wishes to challenge. It is to adopt a "form of life" by 
which everything else is to be judged. 
While Winner does recognize that the problem is very much one of the nature of 
the discourse surrounding the issue, he fails to explore the fact that "necessity" may be 
51 Ibid., p.36. 
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seen to be part of the rhetorical vocabulary used in attempts to close the argument about 
the morality of particular technological developments. To speak about the "morality of 
necessity" then is to play the game of those who use such terms as "necessity" and 
"efficiency" as if they were technologically defined rather than politically defined terms. 
In fact the phrase "moral claims of practical necessity" has the force of reducing the 
political (moral claims) to the technological (necessity). 
The continuing irony is that Winner does appear to recognize that the inherently 
political quality of technologies is very much constituted by language about 
technologies - essentially the ideological nature of science and technology referred to 
above. He writes "In many instances, to say that some technologies are inherently 
political is to say that certain widely accepted reasons of practical necessity - especially 
the need to maintain crucial technological systems as smoothly working entities - have 
tended to eclipse other sorts of moral and political r e a s o n i n g " . 5 3 it is important to 
notice how different this is from any claim about the "technology itself. Here the key 
issue is not the inherently political nature of a particular technology but claims made 
about the requirements of that technology. The technology then comes to be understood 
as inherently political if those claims become the dominant discourse surrounding that 
technology, put cmdely;if those claims win the technological debate. 
It is in fact in these terms that Winner admits that "it is still true that in a world 
in which human beings make and maintain artificial systems nothing is "required" in an 
absolute sense. Nevertheless, once a course of action is underway, once artifacts such 
as nuclear power plants have been built and put into operation, the kinds of reasoning 
that justify the adaptation of social life to technical requirements pop up as 
spontaneously as flowers in the s p r i n g " . 5 4 Thus, there are no "inherently political 
technologies". There are decisions which have been made which lead to "kinds of 
reasoning" to justify particular political arrangements. However, to suggest that they 
"pop up as spontaneously as flowers in spring" is to ignore the political processes by 
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which a particular ideological perspective becomes the dominant one in any 
technological debate. 
It is interesting, too, that despite his reference here to a nuclear plant as an 
"artifact", Winner chooses in this discussion to speak primarily of "technical systems" 
and move away from a concentration on technology as "hardware". As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, a concept such as "inherently political" or "autonomous" 
technology is more easily justified when one includes in the very definition of 
technology the political organization of the particular artifact or technique. The need to 
clarify the understanding of "use', "artifact" and "technique" discussed above, becomes 
lost in this systems approach. 
Technology - inherently authoritarian or democratic? 
In fact, Winner's conclusion to his discussion of inherently political technology 
highlights the ambiguity of his claims about the political nature of technology. "In the 
second instance we examined ways in which the intractable qualities of certain kinds of 
technology are strongly, perhaps unavoidably, linked to particular institutionalized 
patterns of power and authority. Hence the initial choice about whether or not to adopt 
something is decisive in regards to its consequences. There are no altemative physical 
designs or arrangements that could make a significant difference; there are, 
furthermore, no genuine possibilities for creative intervention by different social 
systems - capitalist or socialist - that could change the intractability of the entity or 
significantly alter the quality of its poUtical e f f e c t s " . ^ ^ 
Winner here actually links certain technologies to "particular institutionalized 
patterns of power and authority". He suggests that certain technologies serve to 
reinforce existing pattems of authority. How far can they then be said to be "inherently" 
political? "Inherently political" would seem to suggest that the poUtical formation issues 
forth from the technology itself, rather than being linked with any existing political 
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formation. Rather than focussing on nuclear power which for him reinforces a 
hierarchical, centralized, and bureaucratic form of control, in short, existing power 
arrangements. Winner would have been more convincing if he had provided an 
example of a technology that is inherently liberating, decentralized and democratic; that 
is, a technology that could not be said to simply "reflect" the existing power relations. 
If technologies are to be said to be inherently political, evidence must be provided from 
a wide range of political expressions. Unfortunately, Winner, like Dickson, here 
appears to use "political" in a slightly pejorative manner - to describe tendencies to 
domination rather than liberation. 
However, the idea that there can be inherently democratic characteristics in a 
particular technology is one that Winner finds difficult to accept. As we have seen, due 
to his tendency to conflate the political and the ideological, to argue that technologies 
are inherently political is to argue that they are inherently anti-democratic and 
authoritarian. So, while in his discussion in "Do artifacts have politics?", he leaves the 
question open, in a later chapter entitled "Mythinformation", his position becomes 
much clearer. I will briefly refer to it 
"Mythinformation" 
The issue Winner addresses in this chapter is the claim of information technology 
enthusiasts that a computer "revolution" is in the process of transforming social and 
political life. After examining the appropriateness of applying the metaphor 
"revolution", with its obvious political connotations, to the various technological 
changes. Winner proceeds to examine the explicit political claims made for the new 
technologies by their proponents. His conclusion here appears to be far more definite 
than in his earlier discussion and is worth quoting at length: 
"Current developments in the information age suggest an increase in power by 
those who already had a great deal of power, an enhanced centralization of control by 
those akeady prepared for control, an augmentation of wealth by the akeady wealthy. 
Far from demonstrating a revolution in patterns of social and political influence, 
empirical studies of computers and social change usually show powerful groups 
adapting computerized methods to retain control. That is not surprising. Those best 
situated to take advantage of the power of a new technology are often those previously 
well situated by dint of wealth, social standing and institutional position".^^ (Italics 
added) 
Here Winner clearly locates the politics of technology within the framework of 
power within specific social relations. The claims by computer enthusiasts that 
information technology may be inherently democratic are dismissed, not in terms of 
what might be "compatible" with the technology or what it may "require", but in terms 
of the realities of existing power structures. However, many authors have argued that 
recent technical developments in information technology are in fact "highly compatible" 
with democratic social arrangements, more compatible than with hierarchical and 
centralized forms of o r g a n i z a t i o n . ^ ^ Yet Winner refuses to acknowledge that such 
technologies might be said to be inherently political. Here he shifts his ground from his 
earlier discussion where he argued that the technical demands determine the political 
arrangements. Now, he argues that whatever the technical potential of computer 
technology, the political realities will thwart them. In fact, he appears to imply that what 
a technology might require is either irrelevant in the light of the power arrangements 
within a particular community or in fact determined by those power arrangements. 
Why there should be this ambivalence relates again to Winner's understanding 
of the political nature of technology as essentially the expression of anti-democratic 
sentiments. This is made clear when he argues that "if there is to be a computer 
revolution, the best guess is that it will have a distinctly conservative q u a l i t y " . 5 8 The 
reason for this Hes not in the technology but in the political and social context in which 
these changes will take place. So, although Winner grants that it is possible that "a 
society strongly rooted in computer and telecommunications systems could be one in 
57 ^ M a t h e w s , J., Tr>nk of Change. (Pluto Press, Sydney 1989). 
58 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, p. 107. 
which participatory democracy, decentralized political control, and social equality are 
fully r e a l i z e d " 5 9 , he argues that there would need to be conscious political action. 
However, such action would need to centre on "shaping the institutions of the 
information age in ways that maximize human freedom while putting limits upon 
concentrations of p o w e r " . 6 0 
However, there is a paradox here. If the very technologies empower further 
those already with power, as Winner claims, how is it to be possible that limits can be 
placed on those concentrations of power? Winner still appears to see the solutions to 
problems surrounding technology as located in debate about the ends of those 
technologies rather than in terms of the power relations that shape the technology in the 
first place. 
5 9 I b i i 60 Ibid., p. 107-8. 
Technology and ideology 
In this chapter, however. Winner does make explicit what has been implicit in 
his whole discussion of technology and politics - the role of ideology. He defines 
"ideology" as "a set of beliefs that expresses the needs and aspirations of a group, 
class, culture or subculture".61 He recognizes that the debate about the democratic 
possibilities of computer technology is very much shaped by an ideology serving the 
interests of those who have most to gain from the growth of the computer industry. 
However, Winner continues to refuse to grant that this is essentially a political 
issue. He attributes this instead to the demands of the system. "In this instance the 
needs and aspirations that matter most are those that stem from operational requirements 
of highly complex systems in an advanced technological society; the groups most 
directly involved are those who build, maintain, operate improve, and market these 
s y s t e m s " . 6 2 xhe power of these groups is located in "the operational requirements of 
highly complex systems in an advanced technological society". This is reminiscent of 
the post-industrial thesis of Daniel Bell who makes a similar distinction between the 
power of the technicians of the newly-emerging post-industrial society and the "polity" 
whose responsibility it is to determine the "political" goals of these technical 
capacities.^3 
Thus the fruitful analytical possibilities raised by Winner's discussion of the 
nature of ideology are ignored in favour of a subde adoption of a type of technocratic 
ideology, in order that he might maintain a focus on "technology itself. He certainly 
does not pursue the argument that all claims about technology may be ideological, 
whether they argue for the inherendy democratic nature of computer technology or the 
demands for centralized authority in the nuclear industry. It is not then a question that 
can be addressed in terms of naivety or conspiracy, but rather of value commitment. 
61Ibid. ,p.l l3. 
6 2 I b i i 
63 Cf. Bell, D., The Coming of the Post-Industrial Societv (Heinemann, London 
1976) 
It is interesting to note that since Winner is unable to demonstrate the 
undemocratic nature of computer technology "itself", he returns to a discussion of 
effects to justify his concern. Previously, the effects of technology were relegated to the 
fringes of Winner's argument, as his central concern was the political nature of the 
technology itself. However, in this case. Winner returns to effects; "The efficient 
management of information is revealed as the telos of modem society, its greatest 
mission. It is that fact to which mythinformation adds glory and glitter. People must be 
convinced that the human burdens of an information age - unemployment, de-skilling, 
the disruption of many social patterns - are worth bearing".64 Whereas artifacts which 
reflected hierarchical and centralizing tendencies were previously considered political 
because of their shaping of political and social arrangements, here the political issues 
surrounding potentially non-hierarchical artifacts are their effects on employment and 
skill. 
In his later chapters on appropriate technology, risk and decentralization. 
Winner continues to reject claims for the inherently democratic nature of technology. 
Rather than welcoming this emphasis, he criticizes their proponents for their naivety. 
Again, for Winner, to understand technology as political is to understand it as reflecting 
existing non-democratic power relationships, rather than it requiring certain political 
arrangements. Therefore, for all the claims to be focussing on the technology itself. 
Winner's analysis is in fact essentially a focus on the social and political context in 
which technology is located. 
"Techne and Politeia" 
With the emphasis in the first chapters of The Whale and the Reactor on 
technology as forms of life. Winner's commitment to democratic politics has been 
implied rather than stated. It was noted above how an understanding of technology as 
culture has democratic assumptions. However, Winner's analysis continually confuses 
64 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, p.l 15 
a focus on technology as culture with claims that artifacts have politics. While it is clear 
that for Winner there are the greatest possibilities for politics when technology is 
understood as artifact, his commitment to technology as culture leads him to locate the 
politics in the artifacts themselves rather than in the social and political context in which 
they are situated. This dichotomy corresponds with Winner's oscillation between the 
politics which shape the technologies in the first place and the politics defined by the 
resulting constraints of technical systems. This is a continuation of the tension between 
politics as process, and politics as system maintenance noted in Autonomous 
Technologv. This tension characterizes not only the change of perspective within "Do 
Artifacts have Politics?" but also between this chapter and Winner's third chapter, 
"Techne and PoUteia". 
The central argument of this chapter is that technical systems have become like 
constitutions or "regimes of instrumentality". As it is essentially a repeat of Winner's 
thesis in Autonomous Technologv. I will not discuss it in any great detail. However, I 
wish to briefly discuss those arguments in which Winner makes explicit the political 
commitments which undergird his whole thesis and which explain the somewhat 
ambiguous analysis of "Do Artifacts have Politics?". 
For Winner, a political understanding of technology will mean that "all varieties 
of hardware and their corresponding forms of social life must be scrutinized to see 
whether they are friendly or unfriendly to the idea of a just society".^^ Central to his 
concern is that decisions about technology be more consciously guided by a political 
theory which provides a commitment to such political ends as freedom and social 
justice. His conclusion is worthy of quoting in full. 
"What I am suggesting is a process of technological change disciplined by the 
political wisdom of democracy. It would require qualities of judiciousness in the 
populace that have rarely been applied to the judgement of instrumental/functional 
affairs. It would, presumably, produce results sometimes much different from those 
recommended by the rules of technical and economic efficiency. Other social and 
65 Ib i i , p.40. 
political norms, articulated by a democratic process, would gain renewed prominence. 
Faced with any proposal for a new technological system, citizens or their 
representatives would examine the social contract implied by building that system in a 
particular form. They would ask, How well do the proposed conditions match our best 
sense of who we are and what we want this society to be? Who gains and who loses 
power in the proposed change? Are the conditions produced by the change compatible 
with equality, social justice, and the common good?"^ 
This conclusion is consistent with the understanding of democratic politics that 
has informed Winner's analysis of technology and politics through both books. 
However, it is difficult to see in what ways this process would have affected those 
decisions which Winner discussed in his previous chapter. Would this approach have 
affected the height of Moses' bridges, the introduction of the moulding machines or the 
tomato harvesters? The central issue in these examples was that the particular decision 
issued from political power which lay outside the accepted parameters of formal 
democratic institutions. As Winner himself acknowledged, the politics in these cases 
was a reflection of the institutional forms of hierarchy and centralization. The reality of 
the internal "requirements" of the technology clashed with the external ideological 
commitments to democratic principles. However, neither in that discussion or here, 
does Winner suggest how this clash ought to be reconciled. 
As was noted previously, in fact. Winner's commitment to democracy is almost 
represented as non-political. The centrality of consensus to his notion of politics can 
almost be interpreted as the end of politics. For example, he writes, "Insofar as the 
possibilities present in a given technology allow it, the thing ought to be designed in 
both its hardware and social components to accord with a deliberately articulated, 
widely shared notion of a society worthy of our care and l o y a l t y T h e problematic 
66 Ibid., p.55-6. 
67 Ibid., p.55. In language reminiscent of Habermas, Winner suggests the development of democratic institutions where non-distorted communication can t ^ e place: "To nurture this process would require building institutions in which the claims of technical expertise and those of a democratic citizenry would regularly meet face to face. Here the crucial deliberations would take place, revealing the substance of each person's arguments and interests".(p.56) 
issues here are the nature and source of the particular consensus, the institutional means 
by which such evaluation is to take place and the level of flexibility in any particular 
technical development. No assumptions can be made about these issues because each is 
itself the subject of political debate and negotiation. While it might be argued that a 
particular commitment "ought" to be made, the realities of politics frequently 
undermines the prescription of political theory. I will return to these issues in the 
conclusion. 
Despite Winner's claim to be treating technologies as political phenomena in 
their own right, his own analysis in fact demonstrates that the politics of technology is 
to be located in the institutional power arrangements which allow technologies to be 
developed and used in particular ways and the discourse which justifies them, rather 
than in the technologies themselves. His analysis has raised but not explored the 
ideological nature of technological debate and the means by which language, in 
particular, defines and shapes political perceptions about the possibilities of 
technological development. Winner's failure to develop these insights results from his 
commitment to a narrow perception of politics understood as democratic consensus. In 
the final chapter, I will explore these further and then try to assess the value of 
Winner's contribution to the understanding of the politics of technology. 
CONCLUSION 
Thomas Misa, in his study of technological determinism, opens with the 
following words: "If machines make history, they do so only with the assistance of 
others. For the most part, machines are mute and illiterate, and it is historians (and 
others) who decide the extent to which technology acts as an independent force to shape 
history".! He demonstrates how studies of the politics of technology have tended to 
fluctuate between the arguments of philosophers who, taking a macro perspective, 
argue that technology determines social life, and the arguments of labour historians 
who, taking a micro-perspective, highlight the power of workers to blunt the political 
uses of technology. "The principal argument is that those historians (and others) 
adopting a "macro' perspective are the ones who allow technology a causal role in 
historical change. They deploy the Machine to make history. This causal role for the 
Machine is not present and is not possible in studies adopting a "micro' perspective".^ 
Misa places Langdon Winner in the former category, and yet the argument of this 
essay has been that Winner tries to incorporate both arguments in his thesis; and it is 
this that leads to his analysis being ambivalent in its understanding of the ways in 
which technology is understood to be political. It was argued in the previous chapters 
that Winner in fact moves from the broad cultural perspective on technology and 
politics, which he adopted in Autonomous Technoloev, and which owes much to Ellul 
and Marcuse, the "philosophers", to a more critical position in The Whale and the 
Reactor, where his perspective tends to be closer to that of Dickson and Braverman, the 
labour historian. 
However, it is true that even in this latter work. Winner continues to oscillate 
between a more macro perspective treating technology as culture and a more micro 
analysis of technology as artifact, with the understanding of the political being 
1 Misa, T.J., "How Machines Make History and How Historians (and Others) Help 
Them to Do So" in Science. Technology and Riiman Values. Vol 13, Nos.3 & 4, 
1988, p.308. 
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determined by whichever particular perspective is adopted. Winner's analysis confirms 
Misa's point that the greater the concentration on technology as culture, the more force 
is added to the conclusion that politics has lost its relevance; and conversely, the greater 
the emphasis on the artifact, the greater the recognition of the importance of the 
political. The emphasis of the first is how technology shapes political and social life; the 
second, is how political and social life shape technology. 
If Misa's claim that historians and others help machines make history is correct, 
then the key question for this analysis is how Winner's work has helped technology to 
be understood as making history. He has done so by claiming that technologies "have 
politics" in their own right. 
In this conclusion, I want to summarise and expand on what this thesis has 
suggested are the three key weaknesses in his argument: his failure to properly identify 
what he means by "technology itself; his ambivalent understanding of "politics"; and 
his failure to draw out the implications of the ideological nature of the discourse 
surrounding technological decision-making. 
Winner and "technology itself" 
While it was recognised earlier that there are a variety of ways in which 
"technology" might be understood, it is important that, for analytical purposes at least, 
there be consistency in the particular use adopted. This is even more essential when one 
takes as the focus of one's analysis, as Winner explicitly claims to do, "technology 
itself. Here, Winner wants to go further than the "social determination" school and 
explore the political implications of the "things themselves". 
As discussed in the previous chapters, however, Winner finds it difficult to justify 
what constimtes "technology itself. On the one hand, he claims that particular interest 
groups can "use" technologies for their own particular political ends. The argument is 
that those technologies are flexible enough to enable them to be employed for different 
political ends. The implication here, as was evident in Braverman particularly, is that 
there is an "essential" or "purely technical" technology which can be "manipulated" 
politically. 
On the other hand, when he wants to claim that some technologies are 
inherently political, he ignores this perspective and focusses on technologies as 
completed artifacts, arguing that the "technology itself may require particular political 
arrangements. The historical development of technology is ignored in favour of a focus 
on the technological constraints of the present. Misa's judgement can be applied to 
Winner's analysis: "Withal, showing how technology was at once socially constructed 
and society-shaping is difficult to achieve".^ 
The ambiguity in Winner's understanding of "technology" results in him 
obscuring genuine political activity by a focus on the "things" themselves. This is most 
evident when he adopts the phrase "technical systems". He fails to demonstrate that 
"technical systems" are a result of particular technical imperatives. It is difficult to see 
then how the political and social arrangements within the "system" can be understood 
as "technology itself'. This confusion might not be particularly significant in a general 
discussion of technology. But when the focus is on the politics of technology, then 
clarity and consistency are important. 
An important question raised by Winner's four-fold definition of "technology" 
as technique, apparatus, system and network, but one which he doesn't really address, 
is whether these various dimensions can be better understood as stages in the 
development of a particular technology, and if so, how then do they link together? For 
example, what processes are involved in the move from the conception of a particular 
technique to its execution in physical form, and how much choice does the process 
allow in terms of formulation and direction? Is there any part of the process that can be 
said to be essentially technical, or are there, at every stage, political and social interests 
determining the particular direction taken? 
3 Ibid.. p.319. 
Studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge suggest that all scientific 
knowledge is infused with values and interpretation.^ In the same way, it can be argued 
that there can be no "neutral" or "essential" technology, for such a definition implies a 
particular framework or view of the world, which inevitably involves particular value 
commitments shaping that perspective. What is "neutral" from one perspective may not 
be neutral from another. As Brian Wynne comments: "Different social groups hold 
different visions of what is inevitable, what is open to manipulation, and amidst this, 
what human purposes can be constructed and achieved, and how"'^ All techniques then 
can be understood as reflecting particular social values; and all technologies can be 
understood serving particular political purposes. 
Thus, where Winner's emphasis is on the technology itself, a more fruitful 
focus would be on the processes by which that particular version of technology comes 
to be politically dominant and regarded as "given". As was noted above, his analysis 
does raise these questions implicitly, but does not pursue them. 
The central assumption of Winner's argument, and the reason he wishes to go 
further than the "social determination" theorists, is that if one does not acknowledge 
that technologies "have politics", then one is saying that the things themselves do not 
matter at all. However, that is not necessarily so. To argue that particular technologies 
might serve particular political ends is not the same as arguing that the technologies are 
political in their own right. Such a confusion arises from Winner's understanding of 
politics. 
4 Cf.,e.g. Woolgar, S., SlHenrpr The Verv Idea (Ellis Horwood/Tavistock, London 
1988) 
5 Wynne, B., Rarinnalitv and Ritual (The British Society for the History of Science 
1982) p 12 At the same time, Wynne is not consistent in this claim. Discussing claims 
of technological determinism, he writes "Although this is a fundament^ dilemma, it 
ought to be possible to distinguish foreclosure of choice, by institution^ momentum, 
from genuine material entailments\Qx^ics added) He appears to concede here that there 
are "genuine" technical constraints. 
Winner's understanding of "politics" 
As has been mentioned. Winner's ambiguity in his understanding of 
"technology" results in a similar ambiguity in his treatment of "politics". Focussing on 
"technology itself suggests that, for some purposes, technology can be isolated from 
the political and social context in which it is embedded. As much as Winner argues that 
he is supplementing the social determination approach, he in fact either reverses that 
approach by conceptually isolating "technology" from any context or defines 
technology so broadly as to identify it with culture, so that politics, technology and 
culture become functionally identical. As a result. Winner finds it difficult to justify in 
what ways technology can be said to "have politics". 
While it has been noted that "politics" is very much a contested concept. Winner 
is nevertheless inconsistent in his use of it. It is unclear, for example, when he is 
referring to the formal processes of democratic government or the state, and when he is 
referring to the exercise of power within any institution or set of human relations. As 
was noted, his understanding of the concept changes from Autonomous Technology, 
where politics appears to be concemed primarily with democratic institutions, to a more 
general perspective associated with any use of power in The Whale and the Reactor. 
Yet even these two alternatives do not exhaust the varieties of interpretation 
Winner wants to put on the term. So when he focusses on technologies as forms of 
life, the politics is understood to be located primarily in the fact that they serve to shape 
social self-understanding. However, while this is a central theme in his argument, he 
does not explain how this occurs. In fact, with Winner's strong emphasis on 
consciousness and self-understanding, the very possibility of genuine political action 
becomes questionable. However, as was noted above, much of Winner's analysis in 
this regard is not centred on technology as such, but on language and discourse about 
technology. Furthermore, as much as he wants to argue that technologies determine 
political choice, he often, in fact, tends to move away from an emphasis on 
"determination" to a much weaker claim that technologies "strongly influence" or 
"significantly constrain" political choice. The nature of the politics of technology here is 
difficult to define. 
However, when Winner focusses on the politics of "artifacts" rather than on 
systems or "forms of life", he identifies politics as the means by which the interests of 
certain groups or individuals are served by particular technological developments. At 
the same time, however, he oscillates between a concentration on the causes of 
technologies, namely the motives and interests of those in positions of power to shape 
the development and application of particular technologies, and the effects of 
technological developments, namely a description of the constraints of the technologies 
once they are in place. As a result, his use of "political" is confused. The former are 
political in that they serve particular interests; the latter are political because they 
constrain political choice. 
Winner's first argument that technologies have politics in that they serve 
particular interests is, of course, essentially the same as that of Dickson and 
Braverman. And like them, he appears to treat this as a misuse of technology. 
However, that is not necessarily a valid conclusion. As noted above, the implication of 
this claim is that there is a "pure" technology which is being distorted for political ends. 
However, politics is at the very least concerned with competing interests. Winner's 
own definition understood politics as having to do with the arrangements and exercise 
of power and authority. If this is the case, then all technologies can be said to serve 
political purposes^for the building of every artifact can be understood as a political act, 
reflecting the arrangements of power and authority and involving debate and discussion 
about priorities and values. However, who is involved in this debate and discussion is 
another issue altogether. Evaluation of that question will be based on particular 
commitments, for example to democratic principles, and so will be decided by factors 
other than the artifact. No artifact ever determined who might be involved in such a 
decision. 
Winner's argument that artifacts have politics because they settle a particular 
issue within a community is not one that he was able to justify either. In the examples 
he discussed, only the McCoraiick case could be judged in this way. In the rest, there 
was no issue that was settled; simply power relations expressed. In none of them did 
the artifact ensure or guarantee the authority of a particular group or individual and 
alternatively ensure or guarantee the powerlessness of an individual or particular group. 
The artifact was an expression of the relative degrees of power or powerlessness. The 
source and nature of the political arrangements lay elsewhere. 
The second argument that an artifact could be inherently political led Winner 
back to a concentration on systems, where the social organization is already defined by 
the particular understanding of technology-as-system. But more significantly, his 
discussion highlighted the fact that what was political was not the technology itself, but 
the assumptions about technology and the role of associated justifications such as 
"efficiency", which are so commonly employed in discourse about technology that they 
almost come to be understood, as Winner understands them, as "inherent" in the 
technology itself. In this case, it was the rhetorical claims about technology that 
constituted the politics, not the technology itself. 
In both cases, it would be more accurate to argue that technologies reflect the 
existing political power arrangements. However, if this is the case, it is important to 
recognize that this is not a feature confined to technological developments. The same 
might be said of social welfare policies, education and urban planning. 
However, the difference for Winner is that these latter areas are not considered 
neutral but obviously the outcome of political debate. The burden of his argument is 
that technology should be recognized as such as well, but is not. His thesis is basically 
a reaction to a particular view of technology - the use/abuse model - which for him 
obscures the political significance of technology. Dickson argued the same way; but he 
was prepared to locate the politics within the context of capitalism. Winner, however, 
wants to maintain his focus on the politics of the technology itself. Ironically, that 
cannot be done without a consequent denial of the political. 
Politics and democracy 
As has been mentioned, what complicates Winner's analysis even further is his 
tendency to be ambivalent in his understanding of the difference between the political 
and the democratic. At times he identifies the former with the latter, so that where there 
is no democratic politics, he understands there to be no politics. This confusion was 
evident in Autonomous Technologv. particularly in his discussion of technocracy. At 
other times, he appears to define the political as that which is non-democratic. So, for 
example, he appears to suggest that technological developments which serve entrenched 
interests are understood to be political, whereas those which are seen to serve the 
"public good" are not. The implication here is that the political tends towards the 
ideological, with technical necessity being used as a mask for what are in fact "political" 
decisions, that is, decisions which serve to promote particular sectional interests. 
For an argument about the political implications of technology, it is surprising 
that Winner's analysis pays so littie attention to the place of political institutions in 
technological decision-making. In the final chapter of Autonomous Technoloev. for 
example, he draws a distinction between two political responses to the challenges of 
technological development. The first, he argues, sees the political response as 
essentially legislation where "what must be studied are not the technologies but their 
implementing and regulating systems. One must pay attention to the various institutions 
and means of control - corporations, govemment agencies, public policies, laws, and 
so forth - to see how they influence the course our technologies follow".^ Winner 
argues that tiiis has been the most common approach, adopted by consumerism, the 
ecology movements and technology assessment advocates. His own perspective, 
however, sees technology as politically problematic because "it enters into and becomes 
part of tiie fabric of human life and activity" and therefore requires "a much more 
extraordinary, deep-seeking response than the utilitarian-pluralist program can ever 
6 Winner, L., Autonomous Technologv (M.I.T., 1977), p.319. 
provide".7 He cites as examples of responses which take this second approach 
seriously movements such as the school of humanist psychology, encounter groups, 
and advocates of alternative technology. However, one wonders how these movements 
are recognizing technologies as political phenomena in their own right! In fact, they 
tend to be more concerned with consciousness than politics or, perhaps more 
accurately, with consciousness as politics. 
By contrast, in The Whale and the Reactor. Winner criticizes the advocates of 
such solutions for their failure to take political institutions seriously. "In retrospect it 
may seem that these writers were naive, that they underestimated the power of the 
dominant institutions of the late twentieth century. But clearly, that is not true...It was 
not naivety their writings expressed, but rather total contempt for these institutions 
combined with a sense of powerlessness. To avoid the cynicism and gloom toward 
which their thinking carried them, it was necessary to perform a high-wire act along 
very slender threads of hope".^ He recognizes that these responses might be said to be 
non-political because of their rejection of the more institutional political processes. Yet, 
nowhere does Winner's own analysis deal with the role of political institutions, such as 
trade unions or political parties, in technological decision-making nor explore why the 
dominant institutions within democratic communities are unable to properly regulate 
technological developments. His own analysis, in fact, locates the problem more at the 
level of consciousness than at the level of institutions. At the same time, however, he 
can dismiss these social movements for not taking existing institutions seriously 
enough. 
Democracy as consensus 
One explanation for this confusion is Winner's particular view of democracy as 
consensus. I have already noted his failure to justify his commitment to democratic 
7 Ibid., p.320. „ . 8 Winner, L., The Whale and the Reactor (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1986), p.71. 
principles and to define the source of his particular understanding of democracy. This is 
very significant because the variety of particular theories of democracy does not allow 
one to speak so freely as Winner does of "democratic principles". His references, for 
example, to participation suggest that for him such a democratic principle is 
unproblematic. However, Carole Pateman introduces her comprehensive study of the 
concept with the comment that "(i)t is rather ironical that the idea of participation should 
have become so popular, particularly with students, for among political theorists and 
political sociologists the widely accepted theory of democracy (so widely accepted that 
one might call it the orthodox doctrine) is one in which the concept of participation has 
only the most minimal role".^ Winner's references to "democracy" and "participation" 
then require elaboration. His constant reference to "we" and to "society choosing" 
implies a similarly unproblematic view of consensus. For him, consensus appears to be 
understood as the essence of genuine democracy. 
This is made clear when Winner outlines his response to the political problems 
associated with technology. He argues that what is required is "a deliberately 
articulated, widely shared notion of a society worthy of our care and loyalty", and a 
rejection of technologies "incompatible with the kind of society we deliberately 
choose". In the past, "our society has, in effect, delegated decision-making power to 
those whose plans are narrowly self-interested". ̂  He does not explain to what this 
refers or in what way this delegation was effected. Clearly, however, the ideal is one 
where self-interest will be transcended. Not only will a consensus be reached through 
the outworkings of democracy, but that consensus will be based on "wisdom". "What I 
am suggesting is a process of technological change disciplined by the political wisdom 
of d e m o c r a c y " . And again: "As the political imagination confronts technologies as 
forms of Hfe, it should be able to say something about the choices (implicit or explicit) 
9 Pateman, C., Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 
1970), p.l. 
10 Ibid., p.55. 11 Ib i i , p.57. 12 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, p.55. 
made in the course of technological innovation and the grounds for making those 
choices wisely". 
However, there are a number of significant difficulties for him in placing 
consensus at the centre of his political analysis. First, the assumption in the claims 
made above is that wisdom will be an automatic outcome of the operation of democratic 
processes. A brief glance at history will demonstrate the naivety of this assumption. 
Moreover, the very question of what is to constitute a wise decision is in itself a 
political issue involving interests, commitments and value positions. No consensus 
exists on what is to constitute wisdom. 
Linked to this problem is the assumption that there exists an essential truth 
about "right" choices. It appears, then, that not just any consensus will do. For 
example. Winner describes prevailing common attitudes to technological change as 
"somnambulism", which implies something close to "false consciousness". Is Winner, 
then, really committed to consensus as such, or a consensus based on "wise" 
decisions? As noted above, one does not necessarily guarantee the other. This problem 
was at the heart of the analyses by Ellul and Marcuse. 
In their criticisms of the technological society, Ellul and Marcuse each 
highlighted the impossibility of dissent within the technological order. Politics had been 
rendered irrelevant because of the totalitarian nature of technical rationality. For 
Marcuse in particular, the triumph of technology had led to the disappearance of class 
struggle, the "end of ideology". However, what is significant for the present argument 
is that these criticisms were directed at the prevailing consensus in advanced industrial 
societies - a consensus of "democratic unfreedom". Of course, for Ellul and Marcuse, 
the source of this consensus was the technological order which provided no 
opportunity for opposition. However, there was consensus, but not one which they 
regarded as good or "wise". 
In much of Autonomous Technolosv, Winner shares the same perspective. 
True politics is impossible because of the order and rationality imposed by technology. 
1 3 I b i i , p . l 8 . 
People are aware of the costs involved in living in a technological order, but "their 
awareness has an intuitive, largely passive quality. The influence of large-scale 
technical networks is so pervasive and indelible that few of us find occasion to wonder 
at their effects. We know that 'this is how things work'. We know that 'this is how I 
do my job'. The technological order includes a notion of citizenship^ which consists in 
serving one's own function well and not meddling with the m e c h a n i s m " . jhis is 
consensus functioning at its most effective. 
Indeed, Winner's preoccupation with technology as culture can be seen to be in 
fact a recognition of the power of the prevailing consensus about technology in modem 
society. As culture and language provide the means by which a society understands 
itself, they also provide a powerful tool of consensus, shaping consciousness in 
particular directions. And yet, with Marcuse, Winner wants to argue that this is 2i false 
consensus, produced by technologies functioning as forms of life. Thus, people are 
somnambulists, unconscious of the reality of their unfreedom. Only "genuine" 
democracy can "wake people up" and produce a "wise" consensus based on the 
common good. 
Winner's emphasis on consensus is in fact a denial of politics. What he is in 
fact calling for is not, as might appear, a renewal and strengthening of the political, but 
the establishment of a new consensus. While this claim is couched in democratic 
language, there are authoritarian implications here which raise significant questions 
about the validity of the whole enterprise. 
The common good 
To talk of wisdom and the common good is to imply a particular view of 
political rationality, which is problematic indeed. It almost suggests a form of 
democratic positivism. Similar sentiments were noted in Dickson. However 
14 Winner, Autonomous Technology. p.207. 
Schumpeter has written: "There is ... no such thing as a uniquely determined common 
good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational 
argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other 
than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different 
individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different t h i n g s " . He 
suggests that even if a common good, such as "health", could prove acceptable to all, 
this would not imply any definite answers to individual questions. So for example, a 
common commitment to health does not automatically sanction the introduction of 
flouride or genetic screening, because the relationship of these to the broader issue of 
health is a matter of debate - a debate in which the interests of different groups conflict. 
In fact, it is not clear whether Winner understands the common good as 
residing in the democratic process or the outcome of that process, as formal or 
substantive, as ends or means. The "ends" he refers to throughout his discussion are 
such things as growth in human freedom, sociability, intelligence, creativity, self-
government, equality, social justice. If these are considered ends in themselves, it is 
certainly open to debate and disagreement what they in fact mean in practice. If, on the 
other hand, they are understood to be qualities characterizing the process of decision-
making, then questions still have to be raised about the incompatibility involved in their 
realization; between for example, freedom and equality, or between intelligence and 
self-government. The natures of both ends and means, then, are in no way "given" but 
are constituted by the political process in all its untidiness. 
The nature of Winner's commitment to democracy is important here. It is not 
clear whether he is committed to democratic practice per se or as a means by which 
technological development can be better shaped and directed. Again^as was noted with 
Dickson, there is an ambivalence in Winner's analysis. On the one hand, he wants to 
argue that the implications of technology for political arrangements is of as much 
significance as any effects on, for example, the environment, health or unemployment. 
15 Schumpeter, J.A., Capitalism. Socialism and Democracv (Unwin University Press, 
London 1952), p.251. 
On the other hand, there is the implication that democracy will be wise in its decisions. 
Again, there is the confusion of the formal and the substantive, the means and the ends. 
To suggest that the democratic process will result in a consensus by which 
technological developments can then be evaluated is in fact to deny the basic 
commitments of the democratic process and indeed politics in general. Sheldon Wolin 
claims that "the final term of political logic is not q.e.d., because finality is the most 
elusive quality of a political solution. The order of problems with which political 
judgement has to deal is concemed with the achievement of tentative stabilities within a 
situation of conflict. Hence an adequate political logic must be framed to cope with 
contraries and dissymmetries out of a mobile and conflict-laden situation". 
But even if a consensus were in fact possible and desirable, how would it be 
achieved? Winner suggests that "to nurture this process would require building 
institutions in which the claims of technical expertise and those of democratic citizenry 
would regularly meet face to face. Here the crucial deliberations would take place, 
revealing the substance of each person's arguments and interests. The heretofore 
concealed importance of technological choices would become a matter for explicit study 
and debate". There are similarities here to Habermas's understanding of undistorted 
communicative competence as being the foundation of a rational consensus. And the 
same difficulties prevail. What form will these institutions take and how will they avoid 
the powerlessness of existing political institutions? How far would they involve 
participation, and participation by whom? How are "technical expertise" and a 
democratic citizenry to communicate? What is to be the common value language? 
Discussing the British nuclear debate, Brian Wynne noted that "different sides 
interpret the same reality (for example, accidents, or the neglect of research on 
alternative energy sources) in opposite ways. There is apparently no frame of reference 
common to both sides as a basis to reach agreed c o n c l u s i o n s " . 18 Winner does not 
suggest how this might be addressed. Linked to this is the power of the existing 
16 Wolin, S.S., Politics and Vision (George Allen & Unwin, London 1961), p.65. 17 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, p.56. 18 Wynne, op.cit.. p . l l . 
consensus on technology. If technologies as forms of life are so powerful, how might 
such perspectives be changed and "wiser" decisions made? 
Decision-making and the "effects" of technology 
Nor does Winner explain how decisions about technology might be made, and 
in particular, on what basis the "importance" of the decisions might be evaluated. It is 
interesting to note that, in his suggestions, the focus of disclosure is on "each person's 
interests" Here technological development is understood to be essentially "interest-
based", an argument however he was concerned to challenge through his attention to 
the "technology itself. The suggestion is that as interests are revealed, they will 
somehow be conformed to the general good. How this is to be achieved is unclear. In 
Winner's own examples, it was difficult to see what was to be done once the interests 
involved were recognised. What action would he recommend about the tomato 
harvester or McCormick's moulding machines? How would the identification of the 
particular interests result in a more acceptable technological decision? 
The reality, as mentioned above, is that no decisions are made without reference 
to particular interests. A democratic politics is no less committed to an interest-based 
decision process. The key issue is at what level decisions are to be made and who will 
be involved in them. This is where the nature and role of political institutions become 
an important issue. Certainly a democratic politics can be understood to be informed by 
interests in the value of the process as much as in the nature of the particular decision 
reached. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how decisions about technological projects can be 
made unless the possible results of proposed action are established. And yet Winner 
has been concerned to go beyond a concem with effects. "The important task becomes, 
therefore, not that of studying the "effects" and "impacts" of technical change, but one 
of evaluating the material and social infrastructures specific technologies create for our 
life's activity". But how are these evaluations to be made? Much of Winner's own 
analysis has been concerned to demonstrate the impossibility of foreseeing the 
implications of much technological development. Moreover, he wants to argue that 
there may be an inherent political quality about proposed technological developments. 
But how is that inherent quality to be identified other than by reference to potential 
effects? The politics of Moses's bridges, the McCormick moulding machines, and the 
tomato harvester were seen in the effects of these artifacts: restricted access, the 
breaking of a union, unemployment and a concentration of wealth in fewer hands. And 
in the first two cases, they were intended consequences. 
There is an ambivalence in this argument that is very significant. It is clear that a 
concentration on effects requires an understanding of technology as a completed 
artifact, for Winner wants to see effects as a result of the technology itself. Yet he has 
demonstrated in his examples that the effects were in fact anticipated, "built in" to the 
artifact by the very interests which controlled its development. Therefore, Winner is 
happy to speak about effects in these cases because it had been identified that they were 
intended. The implication is that different "effects" could be (should be?) built in to 
accord with more democratic criteria. 
When he argues then that to concentrate on effects is to miss the politics of the 
artifact, he is making a false distinction. He himself only identified the politics involved 
in the development of the artifact by looking at the effects. So, for example, if Moses's 
bridges were a height enabling buses to pass beneath, he would not have identified that 
as an issue requiring political analysis. It was only by observing the denial of access to 
public transport, that the political significance became apparent. Thus Winner only 
identified the politics by first seeing the negative effects of the particular use of the 
technology. However, if what he is in fact suggesting is that all technologies are shaped 
politically and need to be analysed on that basis, even if they have no (negative) effects, 
then one can only agree. However, as has been noted,that is not an argument that 
Winner has been keen to advance. 
19 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, p.55. 
Politics as problem-solving 
It could be argued, however, that the political arrangements of a particular 
technology may only be recognised when a particular problem arises and, in seeking to 
take remedial action, one's lack of power becomes obvious. Where there are no 
problems, there is no consciousness of the realities of political power. As was noted 
above, the key issue is whether Winner's concern is with the particular nature of 
political arrangements in themselves or rather as a superior means of solving particular 
social problems. His emphasis on democracy providing "wise" solutions makes one 
wonder. If, for example, technological development within authoritarian structures 
brought prosperity and contentment to all, would arguments for more democratic 
arrangements have equal force? This of course is essentially the issue addressed by 
Ellul and Marcuse. 
However, if the focus is on technological problems as most political analyses of 
technology appear to be, then the understanding of politics will always be problematic. 
This is due to the fact that politics is then seen to be concemed primarily with the search 
for particular solutions. There will be an assumption of consensus on an agreed path. 
Problem-orientation will call for a crisis abandonment of true politics with all its 
diversity and difference, in favour of a uniform approach which will ensure a solution 
to the crisis. Thus the very process of defining the "problem" and its solution, while 
essentially political, will be seen as the justification for an end to politics. 
Edelman in fact argues that an exclusive focus on problems has significant 
ideological ramifications: "What is the political import of terms that emphasize troubles 
and conceal benefits? They certainly mute conflicts of interest between social groups. 
They also reassure victims of problems and those who sympathize with them that 
concern for their plight is widespread. In these subtle ways language forms help 
mcxierate the intensity of social conflict''.^^ Winner's analysis can be seen to have these 
characteristics. 
However, if the focus of analysis is the development of technology separate 
from any possible negative connotations, then the political dimension of all 
technological development will be recognized and subjected to investigation. What will 
be gained here is a symmetry of analysis, with an acknowledgement of the reality of 
politics as central to the nature of human community. There is no assumed right way 
that can be discovered, but judgements, negotiation and debate that will construct the 
political solution. 
Winner and "Ideology" 
The question of consensus and the political definition of what is to constitute a 
"problem" and its "solution" raises the broader issue of the ideological nature of all 
debates about technological questions and, in particular, the ideological construction of 
a consensus about technology. Winner's failure to address these issues is an 
inexplicable weakness in his analysis, because, as has been noted, his is a perspective 
which wants to treat technology, along with language, as a social structure which 
shapes human consciousness. However, his argument treats technology ontologically 
rather than ideologically. 
In an essay contrasting the approaches to ideology of Althusser and Foucault, 
Cousins and Hussain claim tiiat "In a functional sense tiie notion of ideology is 
polyvalent, it is the point of intersection of philosophical, political and epistemologici 
concerns. It is the notion of ideology, which enables one concem to be transformed 
into another".21 This understanding of ideology in fact very much describes the nature 
of Winner's ambivalence in attempting to incorporate a philosophical emphasis on 
20 Edelman, M., Constructing the. Political Spectacle (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1988), p.l4. ^^^ ^ ^ , 
21 Cousins, M. and Hussain, A., "The question of ideology: Althusser, Pecheux md 
Foucault", Law, J.(ed.), Power. Action and BeUef (Routiedge & Kegan Paul, London 
1986) p. 176. 
"forms of life", a political emphasis in terms of "consensus", and an epistemological 
concem for the reaching of "wise decisions" and waking from "somnambulism". These 
not only highlight his own particular ideological assumptions, but also reflect his failure 
to recognize that common to each was an ideological interpretation of the nature of 
technological change. 
Thus rather than consensus being the source of political decisions, it can be 
more validly claimed that it is in fact created by political activity. As Schumpeter writes, 
"the will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the political 
p rocess" .The important question then is how such consensus is built; and Winner 
does not address this. 
So while Winner recognizes that the meaning of technology should be analysed, he 
doesn't consider that "meaning" might be understood as an ideological construct 
reflecting particular political arrangements. He describes as somnambulism what might 
legitimately be regarded as consensus. He regularly refers to "our thinking" about 
technology, where his discussion centres not on technology itself but on the dominant 
discourse about technology. 
Winner's own work can be seen as part of a project to create a new consensus 
about technology. However, a focus on the ideological nature of language used in 
discussions about technology would have provided a more effective tool in its creation 
than a focus on technology itself. 
It is important to note that "ideology" here is not used in the traditional marxist 
understanding as meaning "false consciousness". The difficulties in attempting to 
establish a "true" technology or a "true" consensus have akeady been discussed. 
Ideology, as understood here, has to do with the social construction of beliefs, not with 
their truth or f a l s e h o o d . 2 3 Such an approach wants to focus on the processes by which 
a particular ideology, which Winner treats as "consensus" or a "form of life", comes to 
provide a particular framework for political discussion. 
22 Schumpeter, op.cit.. p.263. . . r o • i 23 Cf. "Ideology" in Abercrombie, N., et.al.,(eds.), Dictionary of Sociology (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988). 
A central process here is that of language. Michael Shapiro has written: "Politics 
and language are intimately commingled. Because our linguistic habits tend to be 
shaped by a relatively passive language membership, we are apt to neglect the political 
import of our characteristic modes of speaking. If we ignore the rules that create what 
we speak about and how we speak about it, this passivity spills over into our political 
membership, promoting an insensitivity to much of our political life. To enlarge the 
realm of politics - to politicize more aspects of human relations - one must analyze 
language as a domain of political relations and thereby use it rather than be used by 
it".24 
Winner recognizes the value of this approach, as seen particularly at the 
beginning of Autonomous Technologv. when he argues that the ways in which 
"technology" is understood may say more than being prescriptive in one's definition of 
the term. Nevertheless, he fails to apply this perspective explicitly to the rest of his 
analysis, particularly to his proposals for a more effective politics. 
From this perspective then, it is understood that what Winner has been 
addressing are the issues raised not by technology itself, but by the rhetoric about 
technology and the way such claims define the political processes surrounding 
technological change. A more fruitful analysis could be made then of the means by 
which the dominant discourse surrounding technology has been constructed and 
maintained. 
Edelman has written: "Accounts of political issues, problems, crises, threats, 
and leaders now become devices for creating disparate assumptions and beliefs about 
the social and political worid rather than factual statements ... The conventional 
distinction between procedures and outcomes loses its salience because both are now 
signifiers, generators of meanings that shape political quiescence, arousal, and support 
or opposition to causes. The denotations of key political terms become suspect... (T)he 
uses of all such terms in specific situations are strategies, deliberate or unrecognized. 
24 Shapiro, M., Language and Polittral Understanding (Yale University Press, New 
Haven 1981), p.233. 
for strengthening or undermining support for specific courses of action and for 
particular ideologies''.^^ Such a perspective on the language of concepts as tools 
enables many of the ambiguities of Winner's analysis to be resolved. It allows the 
elaboration of insights concerning technologies as "forms of life". It provides a deeper 
understanding of the role of consensus. It resolves the question as to whether 
democracy is to be understood as process or ends and it focusses on the politics of 
technology as characterizing particular discourse. It is just such a perspective which 
Winner's argument continually suggests, but does not d e v e l o p . 2 6 
The work of Langdon Winner has been very important in drawing attention to 
the challenges of technology for contemporary life. What has perhaps made his analysis 
particularly popular is his explicit commitment to democratic politics. His descriptions 
of technology as culture are powerful and he is a perceptive critic of the ideological 
claims made by optimistic advocates of technological development. His work is at once 
narrower than that of Ellul and Marcuse and broader than that of Dickson and 
Braverman. When he recognizes the realities of political power which serve to shape 
particular technologies, he is at his most penetrating. He is not as successful when he 
tries to locate the political in the technologies themselves. 
The great value of Winner's work is in his explorations of technology as an 
idea, and in his attempts to develop a comprehensive phUosophy of technology. These 
25 Edelman, o p ^ , pp.10-11. . • u . u 
26 An approach which does adopt some of tiiese perspectives is what has come to be 
known as "the new sociology of technology". It argues that "science and technology 
are not politics, but politics pursued by other mean"s.(Latour) Its meAodology 
involves^cro-analysis and the processes by which micro-actors constitute the macro-
worid It involves the rejection of such conceptual distmctions as technology 
"society", "economics" and even "democracy" but seeks to treat them as differen 
expressions of network alliances - whether with human or non-hum^ 
L L s do not result in technical effects; everything is effects. Analysis then 
examine how such alliances are constructed by microl^, word, atom or e l e c m ™ . 
For a cooncise statement of this approach, cf. Latour, B. "How to Wnte The ^ n c e 
for Machines as Well as for Machinations", a paper to the conference r^c/ini?/^ and 
Social Change. Edinburgh, June 1986. For a critique of this approach, partî ^̂ ^̂  
failure to give adequate attention to the political context, cf. Russell, S., Ihe boci^ 
Construction of Artefacts: A Response to Pinch and Bijker", Sorial Studies of Science, 
16, 1986, pp.331-46. 
are worthy tasks. Yet, as has been seen, neither of these projects sits easily with his 
particular focus on politics. For they themselves are to be understood, not as the source 
of politics, as Winner suggests, but rather as constitutive of the political process, and 
indeed as political constructions themselves. It is Winner's failure to recognise this that 
renders his analysis of the politics of technology problematic. 
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